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Cash transfer is considered as a relatively safe policy instrument to improve child welfare. 
Over the past ten years, Indonesia has made major progress in reducing the number of children 
involved in child work. It has done so primarily by expanding education provision to increase 
the time children spend in school and reduce the time children allocate to work. This progress 
has been supported by the implementation of poverty alleviation programmes that provided 
income assistance to vulnerable families. The results of this thesis are particularly relevant for 
understanding the role of cash transfer programmes in developing countries. The findings of 
this thesis suggest that the Government of Indonesia needs to reach the poorest children who 
are out of school. 
This thesis aims to analyse whether cash transfer subsidies provided by the Government of 
Indonesia were sufficient for children to decrease the probability of working and reduce the 
hours of working activities of children within households. This thesis includes a detailed 
exploration of differences in impacts by children’s gender and areas of residence. The cash 
transfer for poor students programme is the third-largest antipoverty intervention that targets 
poor households, and it is designed to reduce poverty and enable families to invest in human 
capital development in children particularly. The programme was carried out in Indonesia 
from 2008 and has been in action until today. 
This thesis uses cross sectional data to analyse the effects of the programme on child’s work. 
The data covers children aged from six to 14 from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 
in 2014. The data is non-experimental and programme participation is not randomly assigned. 
The bivariate Probit with endogenous dummy models are also estimated for the probability 
that a child is working, controlling for additional characteristics of the child, head of 
household, household and community-level characteristics. To check the robustness of our 
results, we provide evidence based on two different identification strategies: a separate 
analysis based on child’s gender and residence using working participation of children within 
households, and a regression analysis based on hours worked.  
This thesis has found that the cash transfer programme has a negative and significant impact 
on child’s work activities within households. The result indicates that the programme did 
affect a child’s work participation whether children are considered as one group or are 
disaggregated by sex, by residence or by number of hours worked. We found that the 
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programme has a positive impact on reducing the probability of participation in household 
chores, economic activities and any activity. Children who attended school and participated in 
the programme, in comparison with those children who did not join the programme, have 
experienced a 32 – 38 percentage points decrease in working participation inside and outside 
the home. However, within the subsample of boys and girls, the programme caused substantial 
reduction in economic activities for boys. Meanwhile, girls who participated in the programme 
received a negative impact on the probability of engaging only in household chores. The 
estimate also shows that there is a smaller impact on children from beneficiary households in 
urban areas in activities inside and outside the home than on rural children. Furthermore, it 
has also been found that the programme was able to reduce time spent by children in the 
programme in different working activities. 





This thesis would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my 
supervisor, my family and my friends. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, 
Dr. Arlene Ozanne, for her continuous support, encouragement and guidance during my 
master coursework and thesis process. But more importantly, her thoughtful comments and 
feedback which has been essential for this thesis. Second, I would like to express my gratitude 
to the Department of Economics at the University of Otago for giving me the opportunity to 
continue my studies. I would also like to thank the New Zealand ASEAN Scholar Awards who 
provides me with a very generous scholarship and the support for my study at the University 
of Otago. 
To my dad (Abah), my mum (Ibuk), and my family for their continuous love, prayers and 
support that have enabled me to follow my dreams. I am also thankful to my dear friends and 
colleagues who have tirelessly supported and encouraged me on this long journey, especially 
to my best friends, Hani Sharaf, Michelle Narayan and Yeyu Cong for all academic and non-
academic related advice. Thank you so much for staying in a balanced, healthy state with my 
work and life. To my fellow postgraduate students, Benjamin Shen who shared an office with 
me, I am rather appreciative of your help. To Yonatan Dinku, I am greatly indebted to him for 
his help in discussing about STATA. 
Thanks to all my Indonesian friends who have made my life in New Zealand easier, so many 
that I cannot mention them one by one, but particularly to Anna, Jay, Intan, Arien, Agastya, 
Santi and Radin. Special thanks also go to all the members of the Economic Research Centre 
(P2E) and colleagues at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta.  
The last, I praise and thank Allah SWT for His greatness and for giving me the strength to 




Table of Contents 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... vii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ viii 
List of Appendixes ................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Indonesian Terms ......................................................... x 
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Background Literature ....................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Poverty and Child Labour .......................................................................................... 6 
2.2 The Cash Transfer Programmes ................................................................................. 9 
2.3 Cash Transfers and Child Labour ............................................................................ 12 
2.4 Indonesian Context: Effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programme on Children ....... 18 
Chapter 3: Background and Context .................................................................................. 23 
3.1 Country and Sample Overview: Indonesia and Java ............................................... 23 
3.2 Education and Child’s Work Participation .............................................................. 24 
3.3 Indonesia’s Social Safety Net Programmes ............................................................. 29 
3.4 Indonesian Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Students ........................................ 33 
Chapter 4: Data and Methods ............................................................................................. 39 
4.1 Data Source .............................................................................................................. 39 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................ 40 
4.3 Definition of Variables ............................................................................................ 45 
4.3.1 The Dependent Variables ................................................................................. 46 
4.3.2 The Independent Variables ............................................................................... 46 
4.4 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................ 51 
4.5 Econometric Methods: The Bivariate Probit Model with Endogenous Dummy ..... 53 
vi 
 
4.6 Robustness Check .................................................................................................... 55 
Chapter 5: Results and Discussions .................................................................................... 57 
5.1 Empirical Results: Bivariate Probit Model with Endogenous Dummy ................... 57 
5.1.1 Coefficient Estimates ........................................................................................ 57 
5.1.2 Estimates of Marginal Effects .......................................................................... 63 
5.2 Robustness Checks Based on Gender and Residence .............................................. 67 
5.3 Robustness Checks Based on Work Hours .............................................................. 70 
5.4 Limitations ............................................................................................................... 74 
5.5 Summary .................................................................................................................. 74 
Chapter 6: Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 75 
References .............................................................................................................................. 78 




List of Tables 
Table 1. Comparison of CCT Programme Size ...................................................................... 10 
Table 2. Example of CCT Programmes and Impacts on Education Indicators ...................... 12 
Table 3. Selected Education Indicator Indonesia 2003 and 2015 ........................................... 25 
Table 4. Child Activity Status 7–14 years Age Group in 2009 (per cent) ............................. 26 
Table 5. Children in the Bottom 40 per cent based on their Labour Status According to PPLS 
2011 ........................................................................................................................................ 27 
Table 6. Child Labour Rate Aged 10–17 ................................................................................ 28 
Table 7. Poverty Reduction Programme Targeted to Households and Individuals ................ 33 
Table 8. Amount of Cash Transfer Programme for Each Student (2016) .............................. 36 
Table 9. Cash Transfer for Poor Students for the Academic Year 2013/14 Compared with 
Student Numbers in Academic Year 2012/13 by Education Level ........................................ 37 
Table 10. Sample of Households and Children across Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries 
Cash Transfer for Poor Students Programme ......................................................................... 41 
Table 11. The Participation and Average Hours of Child’s Work by Activity, Gender and 
Residence ................................................................................................................................ 42 
Table 12. Comparison of Independent Variables across Programme Participating and 
Programme Non-Participating Groups ................................................................................... 44 
Table 13. Comparison on Participation and Number of Hours Worked of Child’s Work Across 
Beneficiary Group and the Non-Beneficiary Group ............................................................... 45 
Table 14.  Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics ..................................................... 48 
Table 15. Estimation Results of Bivariate Probit Model ........................................................ 58 
Table 16. Marginal Effect after Bivariate Probit Estimation .................................................. 65 
Table 17. The Effects of Cash Transfer by Child Attributes .................................................. 68 
Table 18. Parameter Estimates Obtained with Endogenous Poisson-Quasi Maximum 




List of Figures 
Figure 1. Indonesia’s Social Safety Net Programmes ............................................................ 30 
Figure 2. Indonesian Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Students Expenditure and Coverage 




List of Appendixes 
 
Table A1. Estimation Results Bivariate Probit Model for Household Chores  ...................... 85 
Table A2. Estimation Results Bivariate Probit Model for Economic Activities  ................... 86 
Table A3. Estimation Results Bivariate Probit Model for Any Activity  ............................... 87 
Table A4. The Effects of Cash Transfer by Child Attributes (Boys)  .................................... 88 
Table A5. The Effects of Cash Transfer by Child Attributes (Girls)  .................................... 89 
Table A6. The Effects of Cash Transfer by Child Attributes (Rural Area)  ........................... 90 
Table A7. The Effects of Cash Transfer by Child Attributes (Urban Area)  ......................... 91 
Table A8. Estimation Results Endogenous Possion-Quasi Maximum Likelihood for 
Household Chores  .................................................................................................................. 92 
Table A9. Estimation Results Endogenous Possion-Quasi Maximum Likelihood for Economic 
Activities  ................................................................................................................................ 93 
Table A10. Estimation Results Endogenous Possion-Quasi Maximum Likelihood for Any 




List of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Indonesian Terms 
Bappenas National Development Planning Agency Badan Perencanaan dan 
Pembangunan Nasional 
BPS Statistic Indonesia Badan Pusat Statistik 
BOS School Operation Funds Bantuan Operasional Sekolah 
BSM Cash Transfer for Poor Students Bantuan Siswa Miskin 
CCT Conditional Cash Transfer  
GoI Government of Indonesia  
IFLS Indonesian Family Life Survey  
JPS Social Safety Net Jaring Pengaman Sosial 
IDR Indonesian Rupiah  
Susenas National Socio-Economic Survey Survey Sosio-Ekonomi 
Nasional 
TNP2K National Team for Accelerating Poverty 
Reduction 
Tim Nasional Percepatan 
Penanggulangan Kemiskinan 










Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the last few decades, national efforts in alleviating poverty in the developing world have 
concentrated on human capital investment as a strategy for development. Cash transfer 
programmes are among the most common social protection policies which promote human 
capital investment. Moreover, several developing countries in Latin America and Asia have 
been implementing cash transfer and subsidies programmes to address challenges posed by 
poverty among poor households in general and that of children in particular. Examples of such 
programmes are Progresa in Mexico, Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Familias en Accion in Colombia, 
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano in Ecuador, and The Atencion a Crisis in Nicaragua. There 
are cases where cash transfers are offered unconditionally, and others conditional on households 
maintaining some commitments such as sending children to school, fulfilling nutritional 
requirements and going to health care clinics. There is growing evidence that cash transfer 
programmes have been effective at raising human capital and contributing to poverty alleviation 
among poor households (Baez & Camacho, 2011; Peruffo & Ferreira, 2017). 
The issue of child’s work has received considerable critical attention in developing countries. 
This is because poor households are especially vulnerable to economic shocks and can have 
difficulties in sustaining consumption. As a consequence, they might have to take children out 
of school to save on school fees and send children to work as an additional income source (de 
Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet, & Vakis, 2006; Rosati, 2003). Examples of such working activities are 
working in home-based enterprises, family farm businesses, and substitute for parent’s time by 
doing household chores. Social protection programmes such as cash transfers provide financial 
assistance to prevent the household from economic shocks and child work. By alleviating the 
economic vulnerability of households, social protection policies may remove some of the 
reasons why families send children to work (Rosati, 2003). The incidence of working children 
is always related to a decline in educational level and performance, which, in the long run, will 
reduce the quality of human capital. 
Cash transfers related to education is one of the policy options that deal with the working child 
issue. With this policy, the government or other public agency provides cash to a household 
when a family has school-age children and meets certain requirements. The assumption behind 
this policy is that increasing school enrolment and attendance would lead to a decrease in 
participation of children in working activities within households and children can be more 
focused on school related activities (Hoop & Rosati, 2014; Rosati, 2003; Tabatabai, 2009). 
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There are studies that have reported that cash transfer programmes are effective in increasing 
school participation and reducing child work. For example, evaluations of several conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programmes such as Mexico’s Progresa programme, Nicaragua’s Red de 
Proteccion Social, and Colombia’s Familias en Accion programme report reductions in the 
probability of a child engaging in work as a consequence of the CCT offer (Attanasio et al., 
2010; Gee, 2010; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Skoufias & Parker, 2001).  Furthermore, 
evaluations of other unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), such as Ecuador’s Bono Desarollo 
Humano programme and Malawi’s Social Cash Transfer Scheme programme, suggest that a 
UCT offer has negative effects on the probability that a child engages in work (Edmonds & 
Schady, 2012; Miller & Tsoka, 2012). However, empirical findings regarding the effects of 
cash transfer programmes remain mixed. While evaluations in some countries suggest that the 
programmes are well targeted and decrease child work,  recent evidence in some countries find 
that cash transfers increase child work, and for several programmes, no significant impact could 
be identified (Amarante, Ferrando, & Vigorito, 2011; Cardoso & Souza, 2004; Glewwe & 
Olinto, 2004; Pais, Silva, & Teixeira, 2017).  
Indonesia has been implementing a wide range of policies and programmes to reduce poverty 
and encourage investment in human capital. The Government of Indonesia also implemented a 
cash transfer to poor students programme to protect enrolment in education and reduce child’s 
work. Cash transfers for poor students, which began in 2008, has now become the third-largest 
poverty alleviation programme in Indonesia, with more than 19 million beneficiary students in 
2016 (Bappenas, 2013; Ministry of Finance, 2016b) . The lack of empirical studies addressing 
the effectiveness of cash transfers to poor students programme in Indonesia is an area worth 
exploring, specifically on how to adapt the cash transfer programme for different contexts 
related to children’s issues. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, compared with other literature 
such as Cardoso and Souza (2004); Del Carpio, Loayza, and Wada (2016); Miller and Tsoka 
(2012) , this thesis uses survey data with self-reported information on whether children get cash 
transfer subsidies from the government. This allows us to estimate the impact on the children 
as a beneficiary. Second, the cash transfer for poor students programme is an example of a 
specific subsidy programme to support basic education in Indonesia. The main contribution of 
this thesis is to examine and analyse this cash transfer programme for poor students. 
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The major objective of this thesis is to investigate how the offering of a cash transfer programme 
subsidy has an impact on the probability that a child engages in working activities and whether 
it reduces the work hours of a working child. In particular, we evaluate a cash transfer for poor 
students programme implemented among poor and vulnerable families in Indonesia during the 
year 2014. This thesis mainly discusses the programme effects on children’s participation in 
household chores, economic activities, and any other activities in terms of incidence and 
duration. First, the aim of this thesis is to find out the influence of cash transfers on poor students 
and their work involvement. Second, even though many studies stated that poverty is the main 
cause of child work, studies that give a fair explanation regarding education and poverty 
alleviation in Indonesia are quite rare. Third, this thesis also compares and contrasts how child 
gender and child residence have an effect on a child’s work activities.  
Data for this thesis were collected using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 
using the most recent wave in 2014 – 2015. The IFLS survey contains detailed information on 
a wide range of individual and household characteristics, including the household socio-
demographic structure, such as age and educational background of household heads as well as 
household size, household assets, household income, and expenditure. In addition, the data in 
community level contains information about the presence of education facilities and poverty 
alleviation programmes. In order to examine the effects of cash transfers on child’s work, this 
thesis combines the individual data, household head, household characteristics and community-
level dataset of a sample of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The sample of households is 
restricted to those who have children aged between six and 14 years old in six provinces on 
Java Island, namely, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, and Banten, and 
it covers both urban and rural areas. The final analysis includes 4,512 children; 21 per cent are 
participating in the programme and 79 per cent of all children are not participating in the 
programme.  
Endogenous programme participation is a concern in any study that compares programme 
participants to non-participants. The endogeneity of the main independent variable of a child 
receiving a cash transfer programme or not raises concerns because the recipients of the cash 
transfer programme are not assigned randomly; instead, students from poor households are 
specifically targeted. In other words, not every child is specifically targeted. The 
methodological approach taken in this thesis is a bivariate Probit model with endogenous 
dummy for estimating the effect of an endogenous binary regressor. To check the robustness of 
our result, we provide evidence using two additional identification strategies. One of them is 
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separating analysis based on child’s gender and residence and the other one is regression 
analysis based on hours worked. 
The results show that the programme has a significant impact on children’s participation in 
different work activities. Furthermore, the programme helps participants reduce the 
involvement of their work so they can spend more time on school-related activities. Compared 
with non-participants, children who participated in the programme experienced a 32 – 38 
percentage points decrease in working participation inside and outside the home. A full set of 
control variables included in the regression shows that child’s gender, child’s age, age and 
education of household heads, household size, and per capita non-food expenditure, household 
living in rural area, community characteristics such as the number of elementary schools and 
the presence of factories have significant effects on working activities of children. There is also 
evidence of heterogeneity in programme impacts, with effects on probability of work being 
larger for boys and beneficiaries in rural areas. The results are robust to a variety of controls for 
observable differences between children who are beneficiaries and those who are non-
beneficiaries children. 
The main robustness results show that impact estimates vary among the children beneficiaries. 
Boys who participated in the programme experienced a negative impact on the probability of 
engaging in household chores, economic activities, and any other activities. On the other hand, 
girls who participated in the programme experienced a negative impact on the probability of 
engaging only in household chores. The estimates also show that children from beneficiary 
households in urban areas experienced a smaller impact of the programme on participation in 
activities inside and outside the home than rural children. In addition, we conduct the same 
exercise for participation in different types of work, as well as for the amount of time spent in 
different activities. The cash transfer programme given to children was effective in reducing 
the amount of time spent involved in household chores, economic activities, and any activity, 
thus allowing children to spend more time on school related activities. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Chapter two is a review of the literature on the 
effect of cash transfer subsidies on working children. Chapter three contains background 
information about Indonesia and Java and provides an overview of the programme. Chapter 
four describes the data source and the main variables used as well as a summary of statistics 
and other descriptive statistics followed by methodology. Chapter five discusses the main 
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Chapter 2: Background Literature 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature that provides the context and foundation for this 
thesis, and highlights the gaps in the literature that this thesis attempts to address. This chapter 
begins by examining the major insights of the literature on poverty and child labour. This is 
followed by an explanation of cash transfer programmes as a poverty alleviation policy and the 
effects on child labour. The last section of the chapter is devoted to the evidence on the impact 
of the Indonesian cash transfer programmes. 
2.1 Poverty and Child Labour 
Child labour is a complex problem in developing countries particularly in Asia, Latin America 
and Africa. Government, policymakers and researchers have focused their attention on how to 
deal with these issues. The effectiveness of the intervention policies and programme 
implementations to deal with child work issues are based on adequate knowledge of the causes 
that drive children to work. There are several underlying factors that contribute to the existence 
of child work: for instance, poverty (Basu & Van, 1998), household characteristics (Amin, 
Shakil Quayes, & Rives, 2004; Suryahadi, Priyambada, & Sumarto, 2005), household income 
shocks (Bandara, Dehejia, & Lavie-Rouse, 2015; Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2006), market 
imperfection (Baland & Robinson, 2000; Dehejia & Gatti, 2005) and parental illness (Alam, 
2015). 
The theoretical literature on child labour has stressed the role of poverty as one of the main 
determinants of a parent’s decision to send their children to work rather than study (Basu & 
Van, 1998; Deb & Rosati, 2002). Research on poverty and child labour decisions has received 
considerable critical attention in the past few years. Most research has used household income 
or expenditure or consumption as the proxy for poverty. Basu and Van (1998) found that 
poverty is an important determinant of working children. According to the authors when 
household income increases, the need for a financial contribution by the children decreases and 
household are able to invest in their children’s education. In addition, the authors noted that 
children living in poverty often have limited access to basic education and are involved in work 
activities.  
According to Amin et al. (2004), parental poverty is the one factor that has been identified as a 
determinant of child labour. They examined poverty and other determinants of child labour in 
Bangladesh. By separating the income into quintiles and analysing other variables, such as child 
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and family characteristics and using a logistic regression model, they found that a family’s 
poverty affects the probability that a child will work. Thus, household poverty can force 
families to send their children to work, thereby preventing the children from investing in human 
capital. Suryahadi et al. (2005) conducted a study of child labour in Indonesia. They examined 
the relationship between child labour and poverty utilising data from Statistics Indonesia and 
“100 village survey”. They stated that the profile of child labour largely mirrors the profile of 
poverty and poverty was found to be an important determinant of working children. It means 
that the characteristics of a working child are similar to the characteristics of people living in 
poverty. Poverty and child labour in Indonesia are largely a rural phenomenon; most of the poor 
work in the agricultural sector; and both are closely linked to the educational level of household 
heads. The findings of these studies confirmed that household poverty was the most common 
reason for children to engage in working activities. 
There are factors that also affect the intensity of child labour as pointed out in other works. 
First, the resources related to family income and the job or the education of the parents 
(Mukherjee & Das, 2008; Webbink, Smits, & de Jong, 2013). The authors noted that there is a 
lower frequency of the children engaging in working activities if their parents have a higher 
educational level. Second, the structural characteristics of households such as the number of 
family members also had an important effect on increasing the incidence of child labour 
(Mukherjee & Das, 2008; Rosati, 2003). Third, the culture as it relates to the existing values 
and norms associated with child labour (Webbink et al., 2013) also affects child labour. 
Understanding how children’s work affects their educational attainments is important for the 
national government to pursue universal primary and secondary education as part of the United 
Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). A clear relationship exists between participation in working activities of children and 
decreasing school engagement and educational achievement, thereby interfering with the 
accumulation of the child’s human capital.  A study by  Sim, Suryadarma, and Suryahadi (2017) 
examined the effect of child labour on long-term growth in human capital. They used measures 
of the output of human capital to production: mathematical skills, cognitive skills and 
pulmonary function. They found strong negative effects of child work on the growth of 
mathematical skills and lung capacity in the next seven years. In conclusion, in the long run, 
child labour will reduce children’s human capital accumulation (Sim et al., 2017).  
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When children work, they are induced to quit schooling, decreasing academic performance and 
rate of grade completion (Edmonds, 2007; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Holgado et al., 2014; 
Zabaleta, 2011). According to Zabaleta (2011) the evidence of the impact of child labour on 
schooling outcomes change over time by examining a three-year longitudinal household dataset 
from Nicaragua. They found evidence that child labour is associated with school failure in the 
medium term. In addition, each additional hour worked over three hours a day is associated 
with an extra loss of about four months of educational attainment three years later. Similarly, 
Holgado et al. (2014) studied the impact of child labour on academic performance using a 
longitudinal survey in Colombia. They found that the number of weekly hours dedicated to 
work and the presence of work scheduled in the morning negatively affected the academic 
performance of child labourers. 
Some studies have examined the negative relationship between child labour and school 
attendance (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2009; Boozer & Suri, 2001). Boozer and Suri (2001), 
using cross sectional data in Ghana in 1988/1989 and regional rainfall patterns to provide 
variation in the demand for child labour, found that an hour of child labour reduced school 
attendance by approximately 0.38 hours. Looking at a very different level of data, Beegle et al. 
(2009) using a panel dataset from rural households in Vietnam found that children’s work leads 
to 30 per cent lower chances of being in school and a six per cent decrease in educational 
attainment five years later. In general, the findings of these studies confirmed that working has 
a negative impact on the rate of school participation for children.  
The phenomenon of child labour is strongly associated with and determined by poverty, the 
most effective policy for reducing the incidence of child labour is through poverty alleviation 
programmes which improve education levels (Basu, Das, & Dutta, 2010; Suryahadi et al., 
2005). In recent years, there has been an increased attention on child labour in terms of social 
assistance policy such as cash transfers programmes. A cash transfer programme is one 
government policy intervention that helps reduce the economic vulnerability of households and 
increase human capital investment, especially for children in low-income countries   (Attanasio 
et al., 2010; Glewwe & Kassouf, 2012; Maluccio, 2010; Skoufias & Parker, 2001). By 
alleviating the economic vulnerability of households, social assistance policies like cash 
transfers may remove some of the reasons that households send their children to work. A 
growing number of developing countries are adopting cash transfers targeted to vulnerable 
families, both conditionally and unconditionally on some behaviours on the participants’ part, 
for instance, school enrolment and school attendance.  
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2.2 The Cash Transfer Programmes 
In the last few decades, national efforts at alleviating poverty in the developing world have 
concentrated on human capital investment as a strategy for development. There is an increasing 
use of a new social assistance policy in the form of cash for poor families both conditionally 
and unconditionally in developing countries. Latin American countries initiated a new income 
transfer as a social safety net policy in the late 1990s. Today, over 50 countries have 
implemented cash transfer programmes around the world, particularly in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and they have spread to several countries in Asia and Africa as well. Cash transfer 
programmes have now become an important part of policy interventions to address the larger 
issue of poverty alleviation in developing countries (Araujo, Bosch, & Schady, 2017; Fiszbein 
& Schady, 2009; Gabel & Kamerman, 2011; Morley & Coady, 2003; Schultz, 2004). 
These programme covers a wide range of aspects including income support, and subsidies for 
household investments into child education, nutrition, and health. In addition, the cash transfer 
programmes are usually targeted to poor and vulnerable households with infants and children 
for the purpose of encouraging investment in human capital (Avila, 2012; Baez & Camacho, 
2011; Dammert, 2009; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Peruffo & Ferreira, 2017; Saavedra, 2016). 
There are two types of cash transfer programmes: unconditional cash transfer (UCT) and 
conditional cash transfer (CCT). The difference is that the CCT programmes need specific 
behavioural requirements, for example, infants receiving immunisation and vitamin 
supplements, children and adolescents attending school and pregnant mothers attending 
antenatal care visits and being assisted by a trained professional during the birth. Unconditional 
cash transfers do not have any requirements imposed on recipients. Cash transfer programmes 
are playing an increasingly important role in improving children’s human capital by stimulating 
investment in health, education, and nutrition. This increased human capital is also contributing 
to breaking the cycle of poverty for younger generations.  
A key feature of cash transfer programmes is the dual aim to reduce inequality and poverty 
rates. Furthermore, cash transfer programmes aim to promote long-term human capital 
accumulation while recognising their role in breaking the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty (Araujo et al., 2017; Baez & Camacho, 2011; Barham, Macours, & Maluccio, 2013; 
Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Gabel & Kamerman, 2011; Morley & Coady, 2003; Schultz, 2004). 
These programmes are attractive in countries with high levels of income inequality, low 
education levels, poor health, and poor nutrition. Additionally, these programmes provide 
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assistance to poor households by providing regular cash payments to address household 
vulnerability. 
Cash transfer programmes were first implemented in the 1990s and since then have been 
implemented extensively in developing countries, especially across Latin America, for instance, 
Progresa (now referred to as Opportunidades) in Mexico, Bolsa Escola (now called Bolsa 
Familia) in Brazil, PETI (Programa de Erradicaçao do Trabalho Infantil) in Brazil, Red de 
Proteccion Social in Nicaragua, Bono Desarollo Humano in Ecuador, PRAF (Programa de 
Asignación Familiar) in Honduras, and FA (Familias en Acción) in Colombia. Elsewhere, there 
are large-scale programmes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Turkey, and pilot programmes in 
Cambodia, Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, and South Africa, among others.  
Most programmes in Latin America are conditional cash transfers. The role of CCT 
programmes in social policy varies from place to place because of the differences in both the 
design and context of the programme in which they operate. Most obviously, CCT programmes 
vary with respect to the number of beneficiaries. In terms of absolute coverage, they range from 
14 million households in Brazil to six million households in Mexico. In terms of budget, the 
costs range from about 0.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in such countries as Brazil 
to 0.2 per cent of GDP in Nicaragua.   
Table 1. Comparison of CCT Programme Size 







Bolsa Familia  
(introduced 1995) 
Brazil 14 million households 
(until 2013) 





Mexico 6.1 million 
households 
(until 2014) 
US$ 1 billion 
(2012) 
0.3 
Familias en Acción  
(introduced 2002) 
Columbia 500,000 households 
(in 2006) 
US$ 95 million 
(2004) 
n/a 
Programa de Asignación Familiar 
(PRAF) (introduces 1990) 
Honduras 240,000 household 
(in 2014) 
n/a 2 
Red de Protección Social (RPS) Nicaragua n/a US$ 11 million 
(2004) 
0.2 
Source: Attanasio et al. (2010); Glewwe and Kassouf (2012); Glewwe and Olinto (2004); (Maluccio & Flores, 
2005) 
Cash transfer programmes focus primarily on children as the recipients of the human capital 
investments. Investment in human capital, especially in children’s education, is a primary 
policy concern in low-income countries, as investment in children’s education is generally 
considered to help break the intergenerational cycle of poverty (Araujo et al., 2017; Fiszbein & 
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Schady, 2009; Morley & Coady, 2003; Sparrow, 2007). This means that by addressing 
educational problems, it is expected that children from poor households could escape poverty 
that they might have inherited from their parents. Therefore, cash transfer programmes are 
instrumental in promoting children’s education and improving children’s welfare. 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the significant impact of cash transfer 
programmes. Most evaluations of cash transfer programmes and their impact on educational 
outcomes have indicated that they have a positive impact on school enrolment, school 
attendance, and educational attainment (Dubois, de Janvry, & Sadoulet, 2012; Glewwe & 
Kassouf, 2012; Glewwe & Olinto, 2004; Schultz, 2004; Skoufias & Parker, 2001). Studies have 
found a strong correlation between the programme and several education-related outcomes, 
including higher school enrolment rates, better grade progression, lower dropout rates, and 
higher school re-entry rates among dropouts. However, this may not be surprising since most 
of these programmes are conditional upon school outcomes (Baez & Camacho, 2011). 
Cash transfers to vulnerable households are increasingly being used in developing countries as 
key policy interventions to facilitate household investment in child education and health. Cash 
transfer programmes for education are known to be effective in improving children’s education 
outcomes. Evaluations of cash transfer programmes and their impacts on educational outcomes 
have mainly indicated that they have improved school enrolment, educational attainment, 
attendance, and reduced dropout rates in several countries (Attanasio et al., 2010; Behrman, 
Gallardo-Garcia, Parker, Todd, & Velez-Grajales, 2012; Dubois et al., 2012; Glewwe & 
Kassouf, 2012; Glewwe & Olinto, 2004; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Schultz, 2004; Skoufias & 
Parker, 2001). These programmes are particularly effective among the economically 
disadvantaged groups. In the long term, these investments in child health and education should 






Table 2. Example of CCT Programmes and Impacts on Education Indicators 
Name of  
Programme 






Mexico  Positive impact on the school enrolment 
 Positive impact on school continuation at all 
grade levels 
 Decrease in dropout rates, particularly from 
primary to secondary education 
 Positive impact on educational attainment 
Familias en Acción (FA) Colombia  Increase in school enrolment, particularly for 
children aged 12 – 17 in both urban and rural 
areas 
 Reduce the probability of grade retention 
 Males have generally benefitted  more than 
females from the programme 
Red de Protección Social (RPS) Nicaragua  Positive impact on the school enrolment 
 Positive impact in both maths and language 
achievements 
Programa de Asignación 
Familiar (PRAF) 
Honduras  Positive impact on the school enrolment 
 Negative impact in dropout rate 
Bolsa Escola/ 
Familia 
Brazil  Positive impact on the school enrolment 
 Negative impact in dropout rate 
 Positive impact on grade promotion rate 
Source: Attanasio et al. (2010); Behrman et al. (2012); Dubois et al. (2012); Glewwe and Kassouf (2012); Glewwe and Olinto 
(2004); (Maluccio & Flores, 2005); Schultz (2004) 
Evaluations of unconditional cash transfer programmes (UCT) in Ecuador (Bono de Desarollo 
Humano), the old-age pension programme in South Africa, or the child support grants also in 
South Africa, have concluded that all of these programmes helped increased school enrolment, 
reduce dropout rates and improve health and nutrition outcomes in children in general (Asfaw, 
Davis, Dewbre, Handa, & Winters, 2014; Edmonds & Schady, 2012). 
2.3 Cash Transfers and Child Labour 
This section aims to add to our understanding of the role of policy interventions by 
systematically reviewing the evidence on the impact of cash transfers, both unconditionally and 
conditionally, on child labour in developing countries. On the basis of the review presented in 
the previous section, household income can be pinpointed as a factor that explains how a cash 
transfer programme may affect school attendance and child work. When household income is 
high, they are likely investing in education of their children. However, when household income 
is low, they are likely to make inefficiently low investments in their children’s education and 
to let their children work at an early age. 
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Cash transfer programmes are expected to reduce the probability of child work activities and 
number of hours among school-age children through two possible channels. First, cash transfers 
reduce the cost of schooling which includes school supplies, textbooks, and uniform (Edmonds 
& Schady, 2012; Gee, 2010; Hoop & Rosati, 2014). Second, conditional cash transfers require 
family beneficiaries to have their children regularly attend school, thus, the programme 
increases the time children spend in school and reduces the time to participate in work activities 
(Edmonds & Schady, 2012; Gee, 2010; Hoop & Rosati, 2014). On the other hand, the household 
uses part of the cash transfer to invest in assets such as in farming and small business that make 
child work more productive, thus more profitable (Rosati, 2003). In this situation, the cash 
transfer could increase the value of children’s work to the household (Edmonds & Schady, 
2012; Hoop & Rosati, 2014; Pais et al., 2017; Rosati, 2003). Because of this, the likely overall 
effect of cash transfer programmes on child labour is uncertain. 
There is growing evidence that cash transfers are effective strategies for reducing child labour 
in developing countries (Attanasio et al., 2010; Del Carpio et al., 2016; Edmonds & Schady, 
2012; Galiani & McEwan, 2013; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Ravallion & Wodon, 2000; Skoufias 
& Parker, 2001). Most studies focused on children’s participation in work, with a few studies 
discussing the impact on working hours. Some studies focused on specific activities such as 
work in agriculture, whereas others used a more general definition such as child work in 
economic activities or household chores. In addition, methods practised in previous studies are 
varied. Some studies used randomised experiments, and other studies implemented different 
methods, such as instrumental variable regression, difference-in-difference, propensity score 
matching, or linear parametric regression. This section reviews a group of programmes of cash 
transfer for poor households on the effect of cash transfer on reducing child labour.  
The most influential study of poverty alleviation programme in developing countries is the 
study on the Mexican Progresa by Skoufias and Parker (2001). They examined the impact of 
the Progresa programme on children working and going to school in Mexico. Using a double 
difference and cross-section estimator, they found that the implementation of the Progresa 
programme increased the school attendance of children while decreasing their work activities. 
A key methodological strength of this evaluation was the randomised controlled trial. The study 
found that the offer of a Progresa subsidy lowered by approximately 3.1 percentage points the 
probability that boys aged eight to 17 will work, and for girls of the same age range, by 1.2 
percentage points. The programme had a lower impact on the incidence of work for girls relative 
to boys. However, while the subsidy offer reduced the incidence of working, it had no impact 
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on the number of hours worked among either boys aged 12 – 17 or girls aged 14 – 15 who were 
already working. These findings suggested that Progresa may be more effective in preventing 
children from working rather than in reducing the number of hours that children work once they 
are working. 
Colombia created a similar conditional cash transfer programme in 2002, Familias en Acción 
(FA), modelled on the Progresa conditional cash transfer programme. This programme targeted 
poor households in rural areas. Evidence pointed out that the programme increased school 
enrolment, yet it did not imply a reduction in child labour, as time spent at work and school 
may not be perfectly substitutable (Attanasio et al., 2010). They compared work participation 
and time allocation across treatment and control areas before and after the programme using a 
difference-in-differences methodology combined with matching. They found that the 
programme decreased participation in domestic work after the programme by around 10 – 13 
percentage points for younger children, but participation in income-generating work remained 
largely unaffected. The effects on domestic work participation are the largest in urban areas. It 
was indicated that the rate of work involvement was about 10 and 13 percentage points lower 
after the programme, for 61 per cent and 62 per cent of older and younger children respectively. 
Time spent at mainly domestic work was reduced by less than the increase in time spent at 
school. As there is very little evidence that the programme in Colombia decreased significantly 
the time spent by children in income-generating activities, it seems unlikely that household 
income has been negatively affected through this channel. 
The Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) is a CCT which was first implemented in 2000 as a cluster-
randomised experiment that included 42 eligible districts in rural Nicaragua. It is conditional 
on children’s regular school attendance and healthcare visits. The RPS programme targeted 
improving health outcomes for young children aged from seven to 17 years old in poor families. 
Dammert (2009) examined the impact of RPS. He used a quasi-experimental research design 
and quantile treatment effect methodology to measure the impact of the programme. He found 
that boys experienced a larger positive impact from programme participation on schooling and 
a negative impact on the probability of engaging in labour activities and hours worked. The 
result showed that the RPS programme decreased participation in labour activities for boys by 
11 percentage points in 2001 and 14 percentage points in 2002. The negative effect of the RPS 
programme on labour participation for girls is small, just one percentage point in both years 
(Dammert, 2009). In addition, it is important to note that this definition of work in this research 
does not include other activities on household chores. 
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Gee (2010) estimated the causal impact of a CCT offer on both the incidence and duration of 
child labour. His study used data from the International Food Policy Research Institute relating 
to RPS, Nicaragua’s cluster-randomised CCT, to evaluate whether or not a CCT offer does, in 
fact, reduce the occurrence and duration of child labour. The study found that the offer of an 
RPS subsidy causes the estimated probability that a child will engage in work activities to be 
reduced by approximately 10.6 per cent. The offer of an RPS subsidy reduced the hours that a 
child will engage in work activities, given that the child is currently working, by 3.7 hours on 
average (Gee, 2010). The definition of work was the probability that a child is working: number 
of hours a child has worked during the immediate past seven days (not including Saturday and 
Sunday) using post-randomisation method.  
Using different data and method, Del Carpio et al. (2016) conducted an evaluation based on a 
randomised and fixed-effects regression. The study analyses the impact of Atención a Crisis in 
Nicaragua and of its different transfer components on child labour in poor households. Using 
data collected from a sample of about 3,000 eligible households in the treatment group, and a 
random sample of about 1,000 eligible households in the communities that were randomly 
assigned to the control group, the study examined the impact of the transfer on the number of 
hours worked per child during the 12 months before the survey. The regression on child labour 
hours was estimated using a Tobit procedure. The study also carried out a pre/post treatment 
evaluation of the differences (DID estimation) in child labour between treatment and control 
groups. This programme affected the volume and quality of child labour, reducing it in the 
aggregate and steering it towards skill-forming activities. Meanwhile, the programme appears 
to have reduced the use of child labour for household chores and farm work, while increasing 
it for non-traditional, skill-forming activities related to commerce and retail. Indicators reported 
various types of child labour, including household chores, farm work, and non-farming 
activities; number of hours worked per child in the week prior to the survey; number of days in 
which any amount of work was done per child during the 12 months previous to the survey. 
Honduras is another country with a cash transfer programme similar to those of Mexico, 
Colombia, and Nicaragua. The Programa de Asignacion Familiar (PRAF) is one of the largest 
government social welfare programmes in Honduras. The programme was initiated in 1990 as 
a social safety net. The impact evaluation showed that the Honduran CCT increased the 
enrolment of eligible children by eight percentage points and it also decreased the proportion 
of children who worked outside the home by three percentage points or 30 per cent and 
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decreased the proportion who work inside the home by four percentage points or 29 per cent 
(Galiani & McEwan, 2013). 
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) is an unconditional cash transfer in Ecuador since 
1998. The intent of the programme was to assist poor and vulnerable families during an 
economic crisis,1 the programme continued well past the crisis. The impact evaluation showed 
that the programme reduced child work for both paid and unpaid activities (Edmonds & Schady, 
2012). Furthermore, the decline in paid employment is large and was concentrated among 
children who were students at the time of random assignment.   
Cash transfer programmes have proven to be valuable in reducing child labour that arises as a 
response to household vulnerability even though child labour has not been a direct objective of 
most cash transfer programmes. Cash transfer programmes appear to be more effective in 
reducing child work in economic activities, which is typically dominated by boys, than in 
household chores, which is more often dominated by girls. However, studies that looked at 
impacts on child labour tend to focus solely on children’s economic activities. Few studies have 
documented changes in household chores as a result of cash programs, thus underreporting the 
effects of programmes on girls. This is an important oversight as many girls can be attending 
school while burdened by a heavy load of household tasks, and compromising learning and 
therefore leading to early dropout. 
Empirical findings regarding the welfare effects of cash transfer programmes seem to be mixed. 
While evaluation results in the countries previously mentioned suggest that the programmes are 
well-targeted and decrease child labour (Edmonds & Schady, 2012; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; 
Skoufias & Parker, 2001), evaluations in several country found that cash transfers increase child 
labour or that cash transfers have no effect on child labour (Amarante et al., 2011; Cardoso & 
Souza, 2004; Del Carpio et al., 2016; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Pais et al., 2017). 
Malawi’s Social cash Transfer Scheme is a UCT programme launched in 2006. This programme 
targeted the ultra-poor households that were also labour constrained. The study found that 
compared with non-beneficiaries, intervention children experienced an eight percentage point 
increase in household chores (Miller & Tsoka, 2012). Furthermore, the percentage of children 
who engaged in family work increased among boys, resulting in nine percentage point’s 
                                                 
1 In 1998/1999 Ecuador experienced an economic crisis that was characterised by drastic increases in prices and the eventual adoption of the 
dollar as its currency. 
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increase according to the authors’ difference-in-difference and propensity score matching 
estimates. The authors pointed out that the household increased investment in productive 
agricultural assets such as farm animals and land for agricultural production, thus, the 
programme could be increasing household demand for child work. 
Another example of a cash transfer programme that is reported to be unable to decrease child 
labour is Bolsa Familia CCT in Brazil, because the transfers are considered too small to provide 
an incentive to forgo labour income (Cardoso & Souza, 2004; Pais et al., 2017). Participation 
in the Bolsa Familia programme increased child-labour time allocation. Pais et al. (2017) 
investigated the influence of Bolsa Familia on child labour and estimated the effects of the 
programme within a propensity score matching framework. They found that the programme 
increased the number of hours of child labour in Brazil. This outcome might be explained by 
the fact that the programme may have not been formulated well enough to reduce child labour. 
The cash incentive was not enough to support additional education costs. 
Cardoso and Souza (2004) also found that the transfers are too small to provide an incentive to 
forgo the labour income. They found that income transfer programmes had no significant effect 
on child labour but a positive and significant impact on school attendance. The conditional 
transfers helped protect enrolment, but did not effectively reduce child labour in Brazil. The 
other explanation could be that requiring school attendance does not inherently prevent child 
labour since education and work may not be perfect substitutes (Attanasio et al., 2010; 
Ravallion & Wodon, 2000; Rosati, 2003). They also pointed out that the parents may be 
reallocating the time from other activities, such as leisure, to increasing school participation 
rate, thus are not substituting the child labour earnings with the cash incentive from the 
programme. 
There have also been numerous studies of cash transfer programmes in Uruguay, Brazil, and 
Colombia where the results indicated that the programme did not affect child labour (Amarante 
et al., 2011; Cardoso & Souza, 2004). Amarante et al. (2011) evaluated the influence of Plan 
Nacional de Atencion a la Emergencia Social (PANES) in Uruguay on child labour. The 
authors used a difference-in-difference method and found that PANES did not affect school 
attendance and child labour whether children are considered as one group or are disaggregated 
by age or gender. The evidence suggested that either the transfer was too small an incentive to 




Cash transfer programmes are generally designed to increase children’s human capital, mainly 
through a monetary incentive that is given to poor families. In general, effectiveness evaluations 
of cash transfer programmes found that both unconditional and conditional cash transfers can 
increase school enrolment rates, the proportion of school days attended for children as 
beneficiaries and, for some cases, reduce the participation of child work. There are, however, 
large variations in the effects of different cash transfer programmes, and for several 
programmes, no significant impact could be identified. Additionally, cash transfers reduce child 
work as an indirect benefit because few cash transfer programme have had reducing child work 
as a primary objective. Increasing school enrolment and attendance implies that children who 
work or do not go to school can participate in the investment of education. Cash transfers allow 
poor families to keep the children in school, rather than sending them to work. The next section 
provides the impact evaluation of several cash transfer programmes in Indonesia. 
2.4 The Indonesian Context: Effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programme on Children 
The current welfare system of social protection programmes in Indonesia dates back to the late 
1990s. Indonesia suffered from the Asian economic crisis in 1997/1998; GDP per capita fell by 
14 per cent in a single year, inflation was high, and unemployment increased. Furthermore, the 
economic crisis in Indonesia in mid-1997 had a devastating effect on almost all aspects of the 
economy. There have been many discussions on the need for a “social safety net” to protect 
vulnerable households from sudden and unanticipated macroeconomic downturns. The safety 
net programmes were designed as an instrument to help mitigate the effects of the economic 
crisis on the wellbeing of vulnerable households and promote human capital formation. Thus, 
the Government of Indonesia (GoI) developed numerous poverty alleviation programmes in 
areas such as food security, education, nutrition, and health to provide a social safety net for the 
poor. The Government of Indonesia launched a set of new social safety net programmes known 
collectively as the Jaring Pengaman Sosial (JPS) in 1998. 
As to financing education, the Government of Indonesia designed several subsidy programmes 
in the last two decades especially to support basic education, such as the social safety net 
programme, the school operational assistance, conditional cash transfer, and cash transfer for 
poor students. These programmes mostly targeted poor households because they are likely to 
make inefficiently low investments in their children’s education and to let their children work. 
There are numerous evaluations of the impact of social safety net on a variety of education 
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outcomes (such as; Cameron, 2009; Kharisma, Satriawan, & Arsyad, 2017; Sparrow, 2007; 
Sulistyaningrum, 2016; Triningsih & Ichihashi, 2010; Yulianti, 2015).  
Sparrow (2007) investigated the impact of the social safety net in education on school enrolment 
and child labour after Indonesia was hit by the financial crisis in 1997/1998 using a combination 
of National Socio-Economic Survey or Survei Sosio – Ekonomi Nasional (Susenas) and data 
from a 100-village survey. Using instrumental variable regression method, the study found that 
the programme increased school enrolment, especially for primary school-aged children who 
come from poor rural households. This programme was found to increase school attendance by 
1.2 percentage points for participant children aged 10 – 12 and 1.8 percentage points for 
children in the programme aged 13 – 15. In addition, the study also concluded that it has reduced 
child labour for participant children aged 10 – 18 by 3.8 percentage points. An important 
limitation of this study is that it only collected data on activities of individuals in the sample 
households who are at least ten years old. Therefore, it cannot capture the phenomenon of child 
labour for those aged less than ten years of age. 
The social safety net is proven to be effective in reducing the school dropout rates (Cameron, 
2009; Kharisma et al., 2017). Cameron (2009) used data from the “100 village survey” and 
propensity score matching to evaluate the role played by Indonesia’s Social Safety Net 
programme in reducing school dropout rates during the Asian financial crisis. The data was not 
designed to be a nationally representative sample and focuses disproportionately on rural areas. 
The assumption of this thesis was that vulnerable groups would have found it difficult to keep 
their children in school and thus dropout rates would be high. The result has shown that the 
programme reduced dropout by about 38 percentage points at the junior secondary school. 
A negative effect of the social safety net programme on school dropout rates was also reported 
by Kharisma et al. (2017). The study used the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) in 1997 
and 2000 and the intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis. The study found that the programme received 
by boys and girls per 100 children is proven to be effective in reducing the school dropout rates 
in basic education. Furthermore, the benefit of the programme received by boys is more 
effective for reducing school dropout rates than for girls. The findings were the same in Java 
and Bali in that the average number of boys who received the JPS scholarship has shown a more 
significant share in reducing the total dropout compared to those who were outside the Java and 
Bali areas. These findings are consistent with previous studies that JPS scholarship is effective 
in reducing the school dropout rates in junior secondary school (Cameron, 2009). In conclusion, 
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Indonesia’s social safety net programme was an effective poverty policy for protecting the 
education of the poor during the economic crisis. 
The Government of Indonesia (GoI) launched its own household conditional cash transfer 
programme, Program Keluarga Harapan (hereafter referred to as PKH or Hopeful Family 
Programme), in order to improve lagging health, education, and social welfare outcomes among 
poor and extremely poor households. This programme was launched in 2007 as part of the 
Government of Indonesia national poverty reduction strategy. The programme guidelines stated 
that the main goal of the programme was to improve the quality of human development, 
especially for children from vulnerable households, so that children from extremely poor 
households can escape the intergenerational poverty trap. 
Like other CCT programmes, PKH is a conditional cash transfer providing direct cash benefits 
to extremely poor households for access to health and education services. PKH involves 
demand side interventions that compensate poor households for the opportunity costs they incur 
by sending their children to school. The overall aims of PKH are also similar to CCT 
programmes in other countries. The main overall objectives of Indonesia’s programmes are to 
reduce poverty and to promote human capital accumulation among poor households. The 
government also identified four specific programme objectives: first, improving the socio-
economic conditions of the poorest households; second, improving the educational level of 
children; third, improving the health and nutritional status of pregnant women, post-partum 
mothers, and children less than six years in the poorest households; and finally, improving the 
access to and quality of education and health services, especially for the poorest households.  
Evidence on the effect of PKH is mixed. Participation in the PKH was related to increased 
school participation, enrolment rate, and decreased dropout rates (Alatas et al., 2011). Another 
challenge faced by PKH is that evaluation could not find any impact on reducing child labour. 
Partly, this is due to inadequate mechanisms within PKH to deal with child work issues. 
Additionally, the PKH benefit is supposedly not enough to provide incentives for those children 
to quit work and go back to school. Overall, the research evidence supports the view that 
investing in CCT programmes that increase the demand for education can help the poor to 
increase school attendance and decrease repetition and dropout rates. 
In 2005, a school-based education subsidy programme known as School Operation Assistance 
called Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (BOS) was introduced to provide grants directly to 
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primary and junior secondary schools on a per-student basis. The impact evaluation of BOS has 
increased school performance but has no effect on child labour (Sulistyaningrum, 2016; 
Triningsih & Ichihashi, 2010). Sulistyaningrum (2016) evaluated the impact of BOS on 
children’s test scores by using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to estimate the average 
treatment effect, in the absence of selection, on unobserved characteristics. The results confirm 
that BOS can increase student performance. The main finding is that the BOS programme has 
a positive and significant effect on child test scores. Students who receive subsidies on average 
increased their test score. It suggests that the BOS programme in Indonesia has increased test 
scores by 0.26 percentage points or 21.4 per cent. 
Triningsih and Ichihashi (2010) evaluated the determinants and the impact of a school subsidy 
programme on child labour using data from IFLS in 2007. The study found no effect on children 
working activities. The explanation of this result is that the school subsidy programme was 
designed to cover direct educational costs, such as tuition fees, but not indirect costs associated 
with education, such as transportation costs and uniforms, which are recognised as being a 
major barrier to accessing schools for lower-income households. 
In response, the government introduced the cash transfer for poor students to fulfil their 
educational support for other educational expenses. For example, children can use the money 
to purchase books and school stationery, clothing or uniforms and school equipment, 
transportation costs and the course or tutoring fees. The cash programme could help poor 
households facing still-elevated education cost. As it is targeted to students from poor 
households, it could be powerful for reducing the education gap between poor and non-poor 
households. 
There are earlier evaluations of the cash transfer for poor student programme, including analysis 
on schooling outcomes (Yulianti, 2015). The author confirmed that the programme reduced the 
probability of dropping out of school at all levels of education for children in the poorest 25 per 
cent of households. The programme worked towards reducing the dropout rate at around 21.8 
per cent, 29.2 per cent and 85.4 per cent at primary, junior, and senior high school level 
respectively. Although the cash transfer for poor student programme in Indonesia have existed 
since 2008, studies on their ex post impact are few. 
The Government of Indonesia has promoted human capital investment, especially in children, 
by designing several educational assistance and cash transfer programmes to help families to 
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break the intergenerational circle of poverty. These programmes are to address the financial 
difficulties faced by vulnerable groups with inadequate resources. In recent years, a small but 
growing literature that evaluated education assistance programmes in Indonesia. Previous 
studies have examined the impact that cash transfer programmes such as JPS and BOS in 
Indonesia has on schooling and child work (Cameron, 2009; Kharisma et al., 2017; Sparrow, 
2007; Sulistyaningrum, 2016; Triningsih & Ichihashi, 2010). While some research has been 
conducted on impact evaluations of cash transfer programmes on child labour, no studies have 
been found on programmes that transfer cash to poor students. 
This thesis examines the effect of the cash transfer for poor students on child’s work using data 
from IFLS in 2014 – 2015. Compared to the Latin America cash transfer programmes, the 
Indonesian cash transfer programmes have been studied less extensively. Although there have 
been several evaluations of the schooling impact of cash transfer to poor students and other 
cash transfer programmes in Indonesia, relatively little is known about their effectiveness in 
child’s work. This thesis intends to add to the empirical literature on the consequences of cash 
transfer programmes on child work in several ways. First, this thesis uses different types of data 
collected in this survey concerned the working activities of children who were enrolled in 
school and those below age 15. Hence, the data provides a more comprehensive picture of child 
work that includes younger aged working children. Second, this thesis includes household 
chores as well as economic activities as a category of child work and includes the incidence and 
the duration. The economic activities include children working in a family’s own business, 
working on a family’s farm and working for paid jobs. Third, this thesis estimates the 
probability of child work as well as number of hours at work. Fourth, this thesis examines the 
impact on both urban and rural children. Finally, this thesis develops separate models for boys 
and girls to see if subsidies and other variables have different effects on different genders. In 
conclusion, by focusing more on the working activities of children within household’s 




3 Chapter 3: Background and Context 
This chapter presents the country background and overview of the programme. This chapter 
contains four sections: the first section, presents a short introduction to the country and sample 
overview. The second section describes education and child work participation in Indonesia. 
The third section presents the introduction of poverty alleviation programme in Indonesia. The 
last section describes the cash transfer for poor students programme. 
3.1 Country and Sample Overview: Indonesia and Java 
Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia with a land area of 1,913,579 km2, sea area 
of 3,544,744 km2 and consists of 13,466 islands (BPS, 2017). Indonesia is the fourth most 
populous nation in the world, with a population of more than 259 million people in 2016 (BPS, 
2017), and almost 60 per cent of the population is concentrated on the island of Java. This thesis 
will focus on the six provinces in Java namely, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, West Java, Central Java, 
East Java and Banten.  
Indonesia experienced steady economic growth of around five per cent per year over the 2000s 
because of high domestic consumption and growth in exports of manufactured products and 
commodities. Strong consumption growth also reflects rising incomes with many Indonesians 
moving out of poverty and into the middle class. The share of the population living on less than 
US$1.90 per person per day fell from 65.32 per cent in 1998 to 8.3 per cent in 2014 (World 
Bank, 2017). However, the situation looks bleaker when using the international poverty line of 
US$3.10 per person per day as the threshold, which would classify 36.4 per cent of the 
population as poor in 2014 (World Bank, 2017).  Most of the poor reside in the island of Java, 
given that 60 per cent of Indonesia’s population lives in Java. Although Indonesia’s average 
annual economic growth has risen by five per cent since 2010, the rate of poverty reduction has 
recently slowed and there are still large differences in poverty levels between urban and rural 
areas, and across regions in Indonesia. 
The United Nation’s Human Development Indicator (HDI) shows that between 1990 and 2015 
Indonesia’s life expectancy at birth increased by 5.8 years, mean years of schooling increased 
by 4.6 years, years of schooling increased by 2.8 years and Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita increased by about 135.4 per cent (UNDP, 2016). In 2015, Indonesia had an HDI value 
of 0.689, which positions Indonesia in the medium human development category ranking 113 
out of the 188 countries listed in the index (UNDP, 2016).  
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Several targets for Indonesia’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have already been 
achieved. Indonesia continues to make improvements in universal primary education for girls 
and boys. Based on statistics from the Ministry of Education and Culture, primary school 
completion has improved from approximately 88.7 per cent in 1992 to 96 per cent in 2014. 
Moreover, the literacy rate for people aged 15–24 years in 2014 has reached 98.8% with no 
significant difference between males and females. Indonesia has already achieved gender 
equality at most educational levels. For example, the net enrolment ratio of female to male, both 
at the junior and senior high school, is already within the MDG’s target of 104 per cent and 103 
per cent respectively. Furthermore, the net enrolment ratio of female to male at the higher 
education is 112 per cent. However, the net enrolment ratio of female to male at the primary 
education is 99.3 per cent. In other words, based on these statistics, gender equality in education 
has been realised. Despite these notable successes, challenges remain. Indonesia is one of the 
countries that still has many issues to be addressed such as regional disparity, poverty headcount 
ratio, education quality and child work. 
3.2 Education and Child’s Work Participation 
Indonesia’s education system is the fourth-largest in the world, with the MDG of 100 per cent 
primary enrolment achieved. Education is now the largest single sectoral outlay in the 
Indonesian budget, having increased from 7.2 per cent of public expenditure in 2006 to 20.2 
per cent in 2016 (Ministry of Finance, 2016b). Table 3 shows the data in the education sector. 
In 2003 and 2015, the primary school net enrolment rates were 92.55 per cent and 96.20 per 
cent respectively. However, the difference at the junior and senior high school levels was quite 
substantial. At the junior secondary level, the net enrolment in 2003 and 2015 were 63.49 per 
cent and 77.45 per cent respectively. The net enrolments for senior secondary level in 2003 and 








Table 3. Selected Education Indicator Indonesia 2003 and 2015 
Education Indicators 2003 2015 
Participation in Formal Education % % 
School participation rate     
  7–12 years old 96.42 98.59 
  13–15 years old 81.01 94.59 
  16–18 years old 50.97 70.32 
  19–24 years old 11.71 22.79 
Net enrolment ratio     
  Primary school level 92.55 96.20 
  Junior secondary school level 63.49 77.45 
  Senior secondary school level 40.56 59.46 
  Higher education 8.55 17.34 
Illiteracy rate     
  10 years old and older 9.07 4.27 
  15 years old and older 10.21 4.78 
  15–44 years old 3.88 1.10 
  45 years old and older 25.43 11.89 
Source: Asian Development Bank and OECD (2015); BPS (2017) 
Education, along with poverty, is one of the most important push factors for child’s work. The 
cost of education combined with the need to raise family incomes has prompted many children 
to drop out of school and go to work. Child’s work and education are largely incompatible 
activities; in other words, child’s work cannot be associated with successful education. 
Child labour is an important social issue in Indonesia, as in many other countries, because of 
the implication and relation to education and human capital. Economic activity is not the only 
category of work involving children. An even larger proportion of Indonesian children is 
engaged in other productive activities and specifically household chores such as cleaning, 
cooking, and caring for siblings. The estimates of child labour vary depending on how the 
government defines work, a child, and how data are collected. Based on Indonesia’s Child 
Labour Survey in 2009, around 2.3 million Indonesian children under 15 years old, or almost 
seven per cent of this age group, were in employment in 2009 (Understanding Children's Work 
(UCW) Programme, 2012). Almost nine out of ten children perform household chores as part 





Table 4. Child Activity Status 7–14 years Age Group in 2009 (per cent) 
Activity status Male Female  Urban Rural  Total 
Only employment 0.9 0.5  0.4 0.9 0.7 
Only schooling 89.3 90.4  94.4 87.5 89.9 
Employment and schooling 6.1 5.7  2.8 7.5 5.9 
Neither activity 3.6 3.4  2.4 4.1 3.5 
Total in employmenta 7.0 6.2  3.2 8.4 6.6 
Total in schoolb 95.4 96.1  97.2 95.0 95.8 
Total out of school childrenc  4.5 3.9  2.8 5.0 4.2 
Notes: a) refers to all children in employment, regardless of school status; b) refers to all children attending school, 
regardless of employment status; c) refers to all children out of school, regardless of employment status 
Source: UCW calculations based on Indonesia Child Labour Survey, 2009 
 
Table 4 shows that 90 per cent of all children aged seven to 14 years attended school exclusively 
in 2009 while almost six per cent attended school and worked at the same time. Less than one 
per cent of children were in the labour market without going to school, while the remaining four 
per cent of children aged between seven and 14 years old were not involved in employment or 
in schooling. 
Data from the Social Protection Programme Unified Database (PPLS) in 2011 recorded that 
nearly 25 million children live in the bottom 40 per cent households in Indonesia based on 
family income level. This excludes children who are outside of household settings such as 
migrant, street and trafficked children. Among these 25 million, around 1.5 million children 
aged six to 17 years are currently working (Patunru & Kusumaningrum, 2013). This data shows 
that most child labour is concentrated in Jakarta province followed by East Java, West Java, 









Table 5. Children in the Bottom 40 per cent based on their Labour Status According to PPLS 
2011 
Number of Children in the Bottom 40% Household 
By working status Boys Girls 
Not working         12,074,669          11,313,039  
Temporarily not working                 76,461                  65,285  
Working               829,616                607,892  
Total by Gender         12,980,746          11,986,216  
Total Children                                        24,966,962  
Working Children in the Bottom 40% Household 
By age category Boys Girls 
<10                 36,212                  33,118  
10–14               234,232                191,437  
15–17               559,172                383,337  
Total by Gender               829,616                607,892  
Total Children                                          1,437,508  
Source : Patunru and Kusumaningrum (2013) 
Data from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) from 2011 to 2014 show that child labour participation 
aged 10 – 17 varies across different groups of children. In terms of gender, for example, in 
2011, 4.82 per cent of boys and 3.62 per cent of girls were involved in child labour. The 2014 
survey shows that this gender difference in child labour participation persisted over time. About 
3.26 per cent of boys participated in child labour compared to only 2.26 per cent of girls. There 
is also a difference in the rates of child labour participation between rural and urban areas. In 
2011, about 3.80 per cent of urban children and 4.64 per cent of rural children were involved 
in child labour; whereas in 2014, about 2.42 per cent of children in urban areas participated in 
child labour compared to 3.11 per cent of children in rural areas. Therefore, the declining trend 
in child labour, in this case aged 10 to 17 is evident in Indonesia, but the relative importance of 
different factors that contributed to this declining trend in not yet well established, especially 







Table 6. Child Labour Rate Aged 10–17 
Sex/Residence 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Male 4.82 4.70 3.13 3.26 
Female 3.62 3.60 2.56 2.26 
Urban 3.80 3.47 2.54 2.42 
Rural 4.64 4.83 3.15 3.11 
Total 4.23 4.17 2.85 2.77 
Source: Razali Ritonga (2014) 
The problem of child labour in Indonesia is important. In some larger cities throughout the 
country, especially cities in Java such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang and Bandung, children 
work on the streets selling newspapers, candies, food and drinks, or become street singers at 
intersections and on public buses. I have selected all provinces in Java as a case study, because 
Java is the largest and most populous island in Indonesia. While Java cannot be viewed as 
representative of all regions in Indonesia, the study does suggest several patterns that appear to 
be common to other regions. 
Child labour tends to interfere with the development of a child’s human capital and the 
country’s development potential. This is particularly relevant as Indonesia is pushing for a 
paradigm shift in economic development where human capital will play a critical role (Patunru 
& Kusumaningrum, 2013). Papers that investigate the relationship between education and child 
labour find that school and part time work are not mutually exclusive activities (Ravallion & 
Wodon, 2000). Therefore, working does not prevent children from attending school, but 
enrolled children who work are associated with lower levels of school attendance, grade 
progression, and school performance (Cardoso & Souza, 2004; Duryea & Morrison, 2004; 
Zabaleta, 2011) 
Many scholars argue that child labour is associated with and determined by poverty (Amin et 
al., 2004). To reduce the incidence of child labour, the most effective policy is through poverty 
alleviation programmes (Rosati, 2003; Suryahadi et al., 2005). Other policies can foster the rate 
of reduction in child labour by preserving access to education for children from vulnerable 
households. It is recognised that the longer a child is kept in education, the lower the chance to 
be exploited and the greater the chances for future earnings. A cash transfer programme is part 
of such poverty alleviation programmes. Thus, a programme like this is targeted at young 
children in poor households to increase children’s human capital. 
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3.3 Indonesia’s Social Safety Net Programmes 
In Indonesia, social safety net programmes were launched in 1998 to help deal with the impact 
of the Asian financial and economic crises. These programmes continued in 2005 when 
Government of Indonesia reduced fuel subsidies because of the global oil price hike. This 
situation made the government shift from commodity subsidy to household subsidy because 
Indonesia has a great number of poor households. Thus, a commodity subsidy is unfair to the 
poor households.  
The social safety net programmes have gradually transformed into an integrated social 
protection programme targeting the very poor, poor and near-poor households and individuals. 
The programme covers five major sectors, namely, health, education, nutrition, food security, 
employment creation, and community empowerment (Rahayu, 2014). The Government of 
Indonesia identified three social protection programme objectives: first, assisting those who are 
poor in meeting their basic survival needs; second, helping the poor households to overcome 
poverty; finally, protecting the vulnerable households from falling into poverty (Bappenas, 
2013). In addition, the social protection programmes are grouped into four clusters of poverty 
alleviation programmes where each cluster provides focused assistance and capacity building 
to the three groups of Indonesia’s poor: the poorest, the poor and the near poor.2 The 
development and supervision of all four clusters are under the control of the Tim Nasional 
Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan, hereafter TNP2K or Indonesian National Team for 
the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction. 
Cluster one is a poverty alleviation programme targeting households. This cluster consists of 
several social assistance programmes such as an unconditional cash transfer programme, rice 
for the poor, health assistance, cash transfer for poor students and a conditional cash transfer 
programme.  
Cluster two is a poverty alleviation programme targeting the community. This programme 
consists of several community-driven empowerment programmes under the umbrella of PNPM 
Mandiri (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat) or National Programme for 
Community Empowerment which attempts to increase community capacity and self-help to 
create jobs and achieve a better standard of community welfare (Bappenas, 2013). The PNPM 
                                                 
2 Indonesia’s national poverty line is set at consumption outlays of IDR 370,910 (US$ 29) per month per person. This data based on Statistics 
of Indonesia in September 2017. The poorest is a household living below the poverty line (0.8 x poverty line). The poor is a household living 
below the poverty line and the near-poor is a household living in the poverty line and above the minimum line of poverty (1 – 1.2 x poverty 
line). In other words, the near-poor is easy fall back below the poverty line. 
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Mandiri is currently the largest community-driven development operation in the world (World 
Bank, 2012b). 
Cluster three is a poverty alleviation programme targeting micro and small enterprises. This 
programme is broadly defined as microfinance programmes for small entrepreneurs and small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The Government of Indonesia is offering a guarantee 
scheme for bank credit called Kredit Usaha Rakyat (KUR) or People’s Entrepreneurship Credit.  
Cluster four is a poverty alleviation programme called Pro People. This cluster is the newest of 
the poverty alleviation programmes. This programme provides low-cost basic facilities such as 
housing, transportation, clean water, electricity and livelihood to fisher folk, the poor and 
marginal groups in urban areas, less-developed regions and the coastal areas (Bappenas, 2013).
 
Figure 1. Indonesia’s Social Safety Net Programmes 
Source: Bappenas, 2013 
Indonesia’s social safety net programmes have been at the forefront of the central government’s 
efforts to reduce current poverty and inequality while promoting better human development 
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among poor households. In this section, I will briefly explain the social safety net programmes 
in cluster one because the cash transfer for poor students is under this cluster. The main 
characteristics of the programme are to fulfil the main basic needs of poor households and 
individuals that include food, education, health care, nutrition, sanitation and clean water. This 
cluster aims to reduce living costs and economic burden of the poor by providing cash transfers, 
subsidies, and insurance. The identification of these programmes’ beneficiaries is based on the 
socioeconomic conditions of the household. Between 2015 and 2016, 37.8 million targeted 
households and 111.9 million targeted individuals received assistance from this cluster. 
National government spending on household-targeted social assistance programmes has 
increased markedly in nominal terms over the past decade where it has remained within the 
range of 0.4 per cent to 0.8 per cent of GDP. 
As shown in Table 7, the first programme is a temporary, unconditional cash transfer, which 
was launched to help poorer households deal with rising fuel prices. This programme was 
implemented in 2005, 2006, 2008, 2014 and 2015. The cash transfer targeted the poorest 25 per 
cent of households or 16.3 million households in 2015. This programme provides monthly 
payments of IDR 200,000 (US$ 15). 
The second programme is subsidised rice for low-income households and is the second-largest 
social assistance programme in Indonesia. This programme is aimed at reducing the expenditure 
of the targeted groups by selling rice below the market price and improving food security among 
targeted households. In 2016, the total expenditure was IDR 21 trillion or equivalent of 0.2 per 
cent of GDP for 15.5 million poor households (Ministry of Finance, 2016b). 
The third programme is health insurance for the poor with a budget of IDR 25.50 trillion in 
2016 or almost 0.3 per cent of GDP. The programme is aimed at protecting the poor families 
against financial risks during illnesses or other health problems. In 2016, this programme 
targeted 92.4 million Indonesians or approximately one-third of the population. This 
programme has become the largest social assistance programme in the country in terms of 
population, expenditure and geographic coverage. 
The fourth programme is a conditional cash transfer providing poor households with health and 
education services, especially for pregnant and lactating mothers and for children under 15 
years old. This programme aims to improve lagging health, education, and social welfare among 
poor and extremely poor households. In 2016, the programme covered six million households, 
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compared with the total of 66 million households in Indonesia, and approximately seven million 
households below the poverty line.  The CCT spent IDR 10 trillion in 2016, equivalent to 0.1 
per cent of the GDP. 
The last programme is a cash transfer to all school-age children who come from poor and 
vulnerable families. This programme targeted 19.5 million students in 2016 and had an annual 
budget of about IDR 11 trillion, and it now ranks as the third-largest social assistance 
programme behind subsidised rice and health insurance for the poor. This cash transfer is 
managed by the Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEc) and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (MoRA).  
The decrease in poverty in Indonesia is largely attributed to the expansion of such government 
programmes that have targeted poor and vulnerable households. Over the past decade, 
Indonesia has made significant progress in a short time towards a comprehensive and adequate 
social safety net, yet challenges remain as the country continues to expand the net to reach more 
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Source: Ministry of Finance (2016a, 2016b)  
3.4 Indonesian Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Students  
Indonesia introduced its first pro-poor cash transfer on education programme, the Social Safety 
Net Scholarship scheme (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) or JPS3, in the wake of the 1997/1998 Asian 
crisis with the aim of improving the access of students from vulnerable families to education. 
This programme provided income assistance for primary, junior and senior high school students 
and gave grants to selected schools between 1998 and 2003. This programme was replaced by 
School Operational Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah) or BOS programme in 2005. 
                                                 
3 JPS is a social safety net programme for poor people which was established in 1998 to mitigate the impact of crises in 1998. The programme 
covers four sectors: education, health, community empowerment, and employment creation.  
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This programme is a school-based education subsidy which was introduced to provide grants 
directly to primary and secondary schools and to accelerate the completion of the compulsory 
nine-year basic education. The grants were designed to cover direct educational costs but not 
indirect costs associated with education, such as transportation costs, uniforms, books, shoes or 
other educational expenses, which are recognised as being major barriers to access schooling 
for lower-income households. In response, the government of Indonesia introduced the cash 
transfer for poor students (Bantuan Siswa Miskin).  
The cash transfer for poor students is a result of the level of commitment from the Government 
of Indonesia in providing equal access to basic education for the poor. This programme provides 
cash assistance for students aged six to 18 from poor and vulnerable households who are 
enrolled in primary, junior secondary, and senior high school from both public and private 
schools. Protection of vulnerable people, particularly children, is important because Indonesia 
enjoyed its demographic bonus4 and investing in children today will drive opportunities to 
generate capital and wealth (World Bank, 2012a). The number of those aged 10 – 24 has 
increased significantly from 33.5 million in 1971 to 65.6 million, or 25.7 per cent of the 
population in 2015 (BPS, 2015).  
The cash transfer programme for poor students is a centrally funded cash transfer/grant to 
current public and private school students from poor households intended for the use of 
education fees and other non-fee costs of attending school. Targeting of cash transfers for poor 
student beneficiaries was based on a combination of financial conditions of students, 
geographic targeting, and selection of eligible individuals within provinces (World Bank, 
2012c). As for other social assistance schemes, a province-level quota of beneficiaries is 
determined by the implementing agency, in this case, the Ministry of Education and Culture 
(MoEc) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA). Province-based offices then allocate 
province-level quotas to districts. Quotas are calculated on information coming from the 
national poor households registry maintained by Statistics of Indonesia. Next, district offices 
allocate their district-level quotas to individual schools. School, school committees, and school 
principals are then responsible for allocating their quota among beneficiaries. The name, student 
number, and class are compiled and provided to the provincial government. Finally, central 
government publishes a decree consisting of student name, number, and class. Continuation of 
                                                 
4 This demographic bonus refers to the potential of a larger proportion of working aged population and a lower dependency ratio, which can 
drive opportunities to generate capital and wealth (World Bank, 2012a) 
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the programme was conditional on enrolment, attendance and passing grade at the end of the 
school year. 
The basic criteria of the cash transfer for poor students based on TNP2K are the following: a) 
Children of school-going age from households with Social Protection or Family Welfare cards; 
b) Children of school-going age from households that receive the Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programme for Poor Families; c) Children of school-going age living in orphanages or under 
social care; d) Children of school-going age attending Islamic boarding schools whose families 
hold Social Protection or Family Welfare cards; e) Children of school-going age who are at risk 
of dropping out because of economic factors and/or natural disasters; f) Children of school-
going age who have never been to school or are no longer in school but they can register with 
a formal or non-formal educational institution. 
In 2013, the Government of Indonesia used a unified data base5 that is integrated data from 
various sources to determine targeted households for all social safety net programmes. This 
data collected information on households and individuals and is used to categorise the poorest 
forty per cent of households based on household expenditure per capita (Rahayu, 2014). The 
programme’s eligibility for households or individuals can be formulated using different criteria 
such as economic status (extreme poor, poor, near-poor, vulnerable), geographic (based on 
indicators of poverty, education, health) and demographic status (sex, age, education status, 
type of work). However, the criteria to identify beneficiaries also depends on the decision of 
the MoEC and MoRA because they manage the budget. 
The school committee, as an official of the ministry, could also propose students who fulfil the 
criteria but are not in the list in the unified database as program recipients. The recommendation 
of the school committee will be forwarded to the local government, where the candidates will 
receive the programme the following year if they meet the ministry’s requirement. Thus, 
implementation of the programme depends on those identified through the TNP2K and by the 
budget holders. 
The cash transfer for poor students was introduced in 2008. The programme delivers cash 
transfers to students who have demonstrated enrolment, attendance, and good behaviour in 
                                                 
5 The Unified Database (BDT) for social assistance programmes is an electronic data system that contains social, economic and demographic 
information on roughly 24.5 million households with the lowest welfare status in Indonesia, or 96 million individuals. The BDT is used to 
improve the quality of targeting social assistance programmes. It helps programme planning and improves the use of budgets and resources. 
By using data from the BDT, the number of targeted beneficiaries can be analysed from the onset of the programme planning. This will help 
reduce errors in targeting social assistance programmes. 
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school, it means the programme is conditional upon verified enrolment and attendance. During 
the first year of operation, the education cash transfer provided assistance to some three million 
students at all levels of elementary and secondary education. In 2016, the coverage of the 
programme reached 19.2 million students at a budget of IDR 14 trillion and covered 34 
provinces (Ministry of Finance, 2016a). The education cash transfer programme provides a cash 
transfer from IDR 450,000 (US$ 35) to IDR 1,000,000 (US$ 75) per student per year, depending 
on the school level (see Table 8). The cash transfers are distributed twice a year. Payments for 
the first semester are made in August/September and payments for the second semester are 
made in March/April. Funds are channelled to students either directly through post offices or 
delivered by school personnel (Ministry of Finance, 2016a; World Bank, 2012c). 
The amount is intended to fulfil the educational needs of students, especially towards supporting 
their school expenses such as the purchase of books, school stationery, uniforms, school 
equipment, transportation costs to school, and the tutoring fee. Thus, while school operational 
assistance removed barriers to school fees, cash transfer for poor students contribute to covering 
indirect costs. Together, these two programmes address both supply- and demand-side financial 
constraints to universal education (Larasati & Howell, 2014; World Bank, 2012c). 
Table 8. Amount of Cash Transfer Programme for Each Student (2016) 
Educational Level 
Amount of grant 




Junior secondary school 
(State/Islamic/Christian/Islamic boarding) 
750,000 
Senior secondary school 
(State/Islamic/Christian/Islamic boarding) 
1,000,000 
Source: Larasati and Howell (2014) 
The programme’s guidelines state that the main goal is to improve the quality of human 
development, especially for children from vulnerable households so that children from 
extremely poor households can eventually escape the intergenerational poverty trap. In 
addition, the education cash transfer provides an income supplement for households that have 
education-related expenditure and promotes greater school attendance. Moreover, the 
programme aims to prevent marginalised students from dropping out and reduce the probability 
of child labour. Finally, the programme aims to help fulfil the government’s programme for 
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universal and compulsory education, consisting of nine years of elementary school and three 
years of secondary school.  
The education system in Indonesia is delivered through the Ministry of Education and Culture 
(MoEC) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA). The cash transfer programme provides 
transfers from central education agencies directly to students or schools in both MoEC and 
MoRA schools. In 2016, among more than 52.6 million students in Indonesia, over 44.6 million 
or 84.7 per cent attended regular schools under the MoEC, and 8 million or 15.3 per cent were 
registered in religious schools under the MoRA (BPS, 2017). Both the Ministry of Education 
and Culture and Ministry of Religious Affairs have cash transfers providing cash payment once 
enrolment, attendance and other criteria have been verified. 
Table 9 shows that in the academic year 2013/2014 the number of beneficiaries of the 
programme comprised 29 per cent or nearly 15.5 million of 53.4 million students of the enrolled 
student population, including both regular and religious schools. Religious schools had a higher 
percentage than regular school, at 34 per cent and 28 per cent respectively (Larasati & Howell, 
2014). 
Table 9. Cash Transfer for Poor Students for the Academic Year 2013/14 Compared with 










MoEC (Total)            45,200,000           12,600,000  28 
 Primary school            26,900,000             8,000,000  30 
 Junior secondary school              9,600,000             2,900,000  30 
 Senior secondary school              8,700,000             1,700,000  20 
MoRA (total)              8,100,000             2,800,000  35 
 Religious primary school              3,600,000             1,400,000  39 
 Religious junior secondary school              3,400,000                950,000  28 
 Religious senior secondary school              1,100,000                450,000  41 
Total            53,300,000            15,400,000  29 
Source: Larasati and Howell (2014) 
From 2008 to 2016, the number of programme beneficiaries across different educational levels 
and regions continued to increase. In 2008, the cash transfer for poor students targeted around 
three million students across all levels of schooling and in 2016 the coverage was at 11 million 
students (see Figure 2). In 2016, IDR 11 trillion or around US$ 850 million was spent on the 
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programme, equivalent to 10 per cent of central government education expenditure. Moreover, 
this programme accounts for around 18 per cent of all central government resources devoted to 
family-integrated social assistance. 
 
Figure 2. Indonesian Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Students Expenditure and Coverage 
2008–2016 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2016b); World Bank (2012c) 
 
The programme of cash transfer to poor students was introduced with the objective to expand 
the education sector, aiming at a targeted population of a million students. This cash transfer 
programme has attracted the attention of policymakers and experts in the field of social 
protection. The Indonesian cash transfer programme for poor students plays a critical role in 
supporting poor students to maintain their school attendance, reduce dropout rates, increase 
transition rates, contribute to poverty reduction, and thereby improve human capital (World 
Bank, 2012c). 
Targeted programmes can be cost-effective instruments for protecting investments in education 
for the poor, although their effectiveness highly depends on the ability to identify those most 
vulnerable to the crisis. Such policies that reduce the cost of education and improve the quality 
of education can also effectively decrease the occurrence of child labour. The next chapter will 

















































4 Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section describes the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) dataset, which is used in the econometric analysis. The second section provides 
descriptive statistics of individuals and households samples. The third section describes the 
measures of the dependent and independent variables. The fourth section presents a theoretical 
motivation for the empirical strategy. The final section describes the methods and data analysis 
techniques. 
4.1 Data Source 
The main source of data for this analysis is the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) obtained 
from RAND and Survey Meter Indonesia. IFLS is an ongoing longitudinal survey of 
individuals, households, communities and facilities in Indonesia. The IFLS is one of the leading 
panel surveys from developing countries and was first fielded in 1993 with the most recent 
wave in 2014 – 2015 (Strauss, Witoelar, & Sikoki, 2016). This thesis will use data from wave 
five of the IFLS, which was fielded in late 2014 and early 2015.  
The IFLS wave five contains basic information for investigating the performance of the cash 
transfer for poor students programme in terms of implementation and work activities of children 
within households. The data provides both information on the household in which the child 
lives and information on the individual characteristics of the child. The core questionnaire 
consists of basic information about households and individual characteristics including 
demographics, living conditions, assets, income, social measures and participation in cash 
transfer and subsidy programmes. Surveys of communities and facilities contain detailed 
information on community infrastructure, education services and various poverty alleviation 
programmes including cash transfers for poor students. The strengths of the IFLS dataset are 
its size and comprehensive set of control variables that can be included in regression analyses.  
The IFLS 2014/2015 data consists of separate individual, household and community-level 
datasets. Detailed information about household socio-economic traits is available in different 
modules. Specific questions on whether a household is a programme beneficiary or not are 
available in module 2 which is about household economic status. Information about children’s 
working participation is available in module 5. The module considers children from age five to 
14 years old, and it records activities of child’s work for wages, family farm business, family 
non-farm business and household work. Moreover, the module collects information on the 
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number of hours worked in the previous week. The key outcome variables on which the paper 
focuses are work participation and number of working hours.  
The IFLS survey contains detailed information on a wide range of individual and household 
characteristics, including the household socio-demographic structure, such as age and 
educational background as well as household size, household assets, household income and 
expenditure. In addition, the data at the community level collects information about the 
presence of education facilities, natural disaster and poverty alleviation programmes. In order 
to examine the effect of cash transfers on child’s work, this thesis combines the individual data, 
household data and community-level dataset. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The second section of this chapter presents in detail, descriptive statistics of the sample of 
children and households. The sample of households is restricted to those who have children 
aged between six and 14 years old6 in six provinces on Java Island namely, Jakarta, West Java, 
Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java and Banten. The sample covers both urban and rural areas. 
Table 10 provides detailed information about the sample of children used in the analysis of this 
thesis. The final analysis includes 4,512 children between six and 14 years old who live in 3,509 
households with the number of male children slightly higher than female. This sample size is 
large enough for statistical analysis to be performed with many control variables and separate 
analysis for male and female, urban and rural areas. 
The beneficiary household for the 2014 outcomes was defined according to whether the family 
has reported receiving a cash transfer for poor students in 2014. The non-beneficiary household 
for 2014 was similarly defined as any family who reported not receiving a cash transfer for poor 
students in 2014. Out of this sample, 694 households received the cash transfer programme and 
2,815 households did not receive the cash transfer programme. A child in the beneficiary 
household is one who belongs to a family that receives a cash transfer programme. These 
children represent around 21 per cent of all children six to 14 years old in this dataset. The non-
beneficiary are those children in families who did not receive the cash transfer programme; 
almost 79 per cent of all children analysed belong to the non-beneficiary household. In addition, 
based on residence, the majority of children in sample are living in urban areas. 
                                                 




Table 10. Sample of Households and Children across Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries 







N % N % N % 
Number of household 3,509 100.00 2,815 80.22 694 19.78 
Number of children 4,512 100.00 3,543 78.52 969 21.48 
Children by gender             
  Boys 2,322 51.46 1,835 40.67 487 10.79 
  Girl 2,190 48.54 1,708 37.85 482 10.68 
Children by residence             
  Rural 1,484 32.89 1,104 24.47 380 8.42 
  Urban 3,028 67.11 2,439 54.06 589 13.05 
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces on Java island). 
Child’s work used in the empirical analysis was measured using the participation of children 
doing various activities and the number of hours worked per child in the last week as a 
robustness check. This thesis considers children who are engaged in economic activities, 
children who are involved in household chores and children who participated in any activity as 
a definition of work. Economic activities are defined as activities that contribute to household 
income. This may include wage labour, but also non-wage labour such as working for a family 
farm business and a family non-farm business. Family farm business consists of agricultural 
activities and livestock productivity. Family non-farm business consists of unpaid activities at 
the shop. In most cases, children working for their families are unpaid labour for tending crops 
in the field, processing crops and tending livestock (Sim et al., 2017). Household chores are 
defined as activities such as cleaning, cooking or washing, caring for siblings and collecting 
water. Considering household chores as well as economic activities is important when it comes 
to accurately assessing its potentially negative effect on a child’s welfare (Del Carpio et al., 
2016; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Zapata, Contreras, & Kruger, 2011). Furthermore, including 
household chores that are non-economic activities which are often performed by girls should 
be considered in order to avoid underestimation of the programme effect. The category of any 
activity is defined as child work that constitutes either household chores or economic activities 























Boys 9.20 0.60 2.66 0.40 10.59 1.10 
Girls 15.89 1.44 2.30 0.46 16.53 1.90 
Urban 16.60 0.90 3.26 0.45 17.89 1.34 
Rural 8.49 1.22 1.71 0.40 9.24 1.62 
Total 25.09 1.00 4.96 0.43 27.13 1.43 
Note: Mean number of hours for the sample, includes those who report zero hours on each activity. 
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces on Java island). 
 
Table 11 shows descriptive statistics with respect to household chores, economic activities and 
any activity of the sample of individuals. Additionally, Table 11 shows the participation rate 
and the average number of hours worked in the prior week on working activities by children by 
gender and residence. In this table, 27.13 per cent of those children are involved in household 
chores, economic activities and any activity, while more children are engaged in household 
chores than economic activities. Boys are more likely to be involved in economic activities than 
girls: about 2.7 per cent and 2.3 per cent respectively. However, overall participation rates of 
both are low. Girls, on the other hand, have much higher participation in household chores. The 
prevalence of child’s work shows that urban children have higher participation both in domestic 
and economic activities. Relatively, urban children are 17.89 per cent more likely than rural 
children to be involved in household chores, economic activities and both activities. 
Table 11 also summarises the duration of work which is divided into three categories: (i) hours 
spent on household chores; (ii) hours spent on economic activities and (iii) total hours worked. 
The duration of work includes children in the activity who report zero working hours, thus 
clearly these children are not working. On average, children work 1.43 hours each week, with 
1 hour spent on household work and 0.43 hours on economic activity. Table 11 shows around 
27 per cent of children aged six to 14 reported spending on average 1.43 hours on total work 
hours. Girls spend 0.80 hours more on those activities than boys on the weekly basis, because 
girls spend more time doing household chores.  Average hours on household chores are more 




Table 12 summarises background characteristics of children and their families for the 4,512 
children separately for beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups. This is a large set of observable 
post-programme characteristics at the individual, household and community levels that explain 
participation of the programme. Important characteristics were highlighted between the 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups using descriptive statistics. Table 12 reveals a number 
of significant differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups at the household 
levels. It can be clearly seen that the figures revealed some statistically significant differences 
at the child and head of household level between the beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups. 
The data indicates differences between the beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups in age, sex 
and education of the head of households. The heads of households who did not receive cash 
transfers were also significantly more likely to be literate than the heads of beneficiary 
households. It seems families whose head of household has a higher education level are less 
likely to be the target of the cash transfer programme because usually these families have higher 
income and are less vulnerable (de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, & Roy, 2015). In terms of 
household characteristics, there was significant differences in floor, wall, roof, household size, 
television, non-food expenditure and poultry. Households that received transfers also seemed 
to have more members in the households than the ones that were not in the programme. 
Furthermore, households who participated in the programme are more likely to reside in the 
rural area. There was no significant difference between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 
regard to ownership of house, electricity and land farming ownership. 
In the community-level context, beneficiary households live in areas with fewer elementary 
schools, are more vulnerable in the poverty programme, have more factories in sub-districts 
and tend to be living in rural areas. Poor communities have the lowest access to formal 
education because of several factors such as the high cost of education and the scarcity and low 
quality of school infrastructure and education tools. The difference in other variables such as 
the number of flood incidents and number of junior high schools were not statistically 
significant. These differences at the child, household and community-level characteristics were 
all significant at the 5 per cent and 1 per cent levels. We made sure to include these statistically 




Table 12. Comparison of Independent Variables across Programme Participating and 







Children age and sex     
 Age 9.7748 10.1569 -0.3821 *** 
 Male 0.5179 0.5026 0.0153  
Head of household     
 Age 44.1942 44.8751 -0.6809 * 
 Male 0.8589 0.8070 0.0518 *** 
 Education 9.7863 7.9226 1.8637 *** 
Household characteristics     
 Has electricity 0.9966 0.9948 0.0018  
 Has clean floor 0.8115 0.6450 0.1665 *** 
 Has strong wall 0.9102 0.8421 0.0681 *** 
 Has own house 0.7508 0.7358 0.0150  
 Household size 4.6424 5.0072 -0.3648 *** 
 Has television 0.9650 0.9329 0.0321 *** 
 Non-food expenditure 15.4760 14.9768 0.4993 *** 
 Has land farming 0.2185 0.2115 0.0069  
 Has poultry 0.2120 0.2652 -0.0533 *** 
Residence     
 Rural 0.3116 0.3922 -0.0806 *** 
Community-level characteristics     
 Number of flood incidents 1.0260 0.8947 0.1312  
 Has factory in sub-districts 0.6514 0.6863 -0.0348 ** 
 Number of elementary school 7.0587 6.4045 0.6542 *** 
 Number of junior high school 4.6314 4.5150 0.1164  
  Level of poverty programme 0.6361 0.6466 -0.0104 ** 
Note: All estimates are based on households with children aged six to fourteen. 
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces on Java Island). 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
In this section, we describe some descriptive statistics relating to our outcomes. It is useful to 
consider the differences in the mean outcomes across the groups without controlling for other 
characteristics of the household or child. There are two outcome measurements in this thesis: 
participation of child in work and number of hours worked. 
Table 13 reveals clear differences between children aged six to 14 who received a cash transfer 
programme and those who did not. The participation of child’s work was significantly higher 
among the beneficiary group than the non-beneficiary group. Children in households who 
received an education transfer were more likely to engage in household chores and work outside 
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the home than children in households who did not receive a cash transfer for poor students. 
Boys and girls in the beneficiary group show similar differences in work. They were both more 
likely to engage in household chores and less likely to work outside the home, compared with 
non-recipient children. 
Table 13. Comparison on Participation and Number of Hours Worked of Child’s Work Across 







Participation of child’s work        
  Household chores 0.2399 0.2910 -0.0511 *** 
  Economic activities 0.2582 0.3188 -0.0606 *** 
  Any activity 0.0434 0.0722 -0.0287 *** 
Number of hours worked     
 Household chores 0.9486 1.2002 -0.2516 ** 
 Economic activities 0.3579 0.6956 -0.3377 *** 
 Any activity 1.3065 1.8803 -0.5738 *** 
Note: All estimates are based on households with children aged six to fourteen. Mean number of hours for the 
sample, includes those that report zero hours on each activity. 
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces in Java). 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
The number of hours worked in household chores and economic activities in the week prior to 
the survey was statistically different between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. On average, 
number of hours of children is higher for those who have received the cash transfer programme. 
This is true for household chores, economic activities, as well as for any activity. The larger 
mean number of hours recipient children were doing household chores is probably due to the 
higher number of household activities in beneficiaries households, such as shopping, cleaning 
and caring for siblings. The t-statistics of outcome and p-values imply that the outcome 
variables are statistically different from each other at the 1 per cent significance level.  
4.3 Definition of Variables  
The primary interest of this thesis is to assess whether the cash transfer to poor students has an 
impact on both the participation and duration of children in different working activities. This 
section provides a detailed description of the variables of interest in this thesis, to be specific, 
how they were coded and how they were measured. 
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4.3.1 The Dependent Variables 
As mentioned above, this thesis focuses on children aged six to 14 years old. Two ways of 
measuring child work were used in this thesis. The first outcome is the working participation 
of children within households and the second outcome is the number of hours worked per child 
in the previous week according to the survey. For all outcome variables, all work types are 
aggregated into three categories: household chores, economic activities and any activity. The 
summary of dependent variables can be seen in Table 14 below. 
The first outcome is used to examine whether the cash transfer programme has an impact on 
the involvement of the child in different working activities. The first outcome measured in this 
thesis is labelled as chwork, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a child is 
participating in household chores, economic activities, as well as any activity, and a value of 
zero otherwise. The estimated value of chwork is the probability that a child will engage in any 
of those activities. A negative relationship is expected between the probability of participating 
in the programme and child’s work (Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Skoufias & Parker, 2001). That is, 
a cash transfer is expected to decrease the probability of child work. 
The second outcome is used for the robustness check as to whether the cash transfer programme 
has any impact on the duration of child’s work. The second outcome uses working hours for 
measurement, which is labelled as hourswork. This variable is a count variable that records the 
total hours spent working in economic activities and household chores in the previous week. 
The total number of hours of child work activities combining household chores and economic 
activities was also examined. Children in beneficiary households involved in total hours worked 
1.88 hours on average compared with 1.31 hours among children in non-beneficiary 
households. The mean number of hours for the sample includes those children who were 
reported to be zero hours on each activity; clearly, these children are not involved in working 
activities.  A negative relationship is expected between participating in the programme and the 
number of hours of child work (Del Carpio et al., 2016; Edmonds & Schady, 2012; Pais et al., 
2017). That is a cash transfer is expected to reduce the child’s work hours. 
4.3.2 The Independent Variables 
The main independent variable is labelled as cashtrans; this variable takes on a value of one if 
a child received a cash transfer and a value of zero otherwise. The transfer appears to have 
reduced the participation of child’s work and number of working hours for household chores 
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and economic activities (Del Carpio et al., 2016; Edmonds & Schady, 2012; Miller & Tsoka, 
2012; Skoufias & Parker, 2001). As reported in Table 10, approximately 21.48 per cent of the 
children in the sample are participating in the programme, while the other 78.52 per cent are 
not. The participation in the cash transfer programme is potentially endogenous since 
unmeasured characteristics may affect both the likelihood of receiving transfer and the outcome 
variable of interest or child’s work. Our empirical approach relies on cash transfer, and while 
we do observe whether or not an individual has received a cash transfer, we recognise that cash 
transfer variable is endogenous. 
The endogeneity of this variable raises concerns because the recipients of the cash transfer 
programme were not assigned randomly; instead, students from poor households were 
specifically targeted. In other words, not every household is eligible for the programme. The 
targeting and selection of beneficiaries have been carried out by the central government using 
a unified database that contains lists of potential beneficiaries of cash transfer programme based 
on welfare level and socio-economic status of households. The eligibility criteria may induce 
different sources of selection bias including observable and unobservable factors that could be 
correlated with programme eligibility and work outcomes. 
The child work issue is related to the characteristics of the individual children themselves, as 
well as the characteristics of their families and the communities where they live (De Silva & 
Sumarto, 2015; Del Carpio et al., 2016; Gee, 2010; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Suryahadi et al., 
2005). To identify the factors that are associated with working activities of children within 
households, this section explores these characteristics. Guided by findings from previous 
studies, the characteristics consider those of the children themselves as well as those of the 
household heads, the households and the communities. These additional control variables are 
those that influence the household and these factors may also play a role in the effect of the 
cash transfer programme on child’s work. In addition, the additional covariates in the model 
would help improve the precision of the estimates of the causal effect of interest.  
Table 14 presents the definitions, means, and standard deviations for the variables included in 





Table 14.  Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 













Dependent Variable               
   Hhwork 1 if child works in household 
chores; 0 otherwise 
0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.29 0.45 
  Ecwork 1 if child works in economic 
activities; 0 otherwise 
0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.26 
  Allwork 1 if child works in any activity; 0 
otherwise 
0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.44 
          
   Hhhours Number of hours in household 
chores/week 
1.00 3.09 0.95 3.09 1.20 3.08 
  Echours Number of hours in economic 
activity/week 
0.43 3.22 0.36 2.83 0.70 4.33 
  Allhours Number of hours in any 
activity/week 
1.43 4.62 1.31 4.36 1.88 5.43 
Independent Variable               
  Cashtran 1 if children received cash 
transfer; 0 otherwise 
0.21 0.41         
Children Characteristics               
  Age Child's age in years 9.87 2.57 9.77 2.61 10.12 2.37 
  Sex 1 if boy; 0 otherwise 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Head of HH Characteristics             
  Headage Head of household's age in years 44.34 10.53 44.19 10.74 44.88 9.71 
  Headsex 1 if head of household is male; 0 
otherwise 
0.85 0.34 0.86 0.35 0.81 0.39 
  Headeduc Head of household’s education in 
years 
9.39 3.84 9.79 3.91 7.92 3.17 
Household Characteristics               
  Floor 1 if the material is 
ceramic/marble/granite/terrazzo; 
0 is cement/bricks/bamboo/dirt 
0.77 0.42 0.81 0.39 0.64 0.48 
  Wall 1 if the material is 
cement/concrete/bricks; 0 is 
wood/bamboo 
0.89 0.31 0.91 0.29 0.84 0.36 
  Household size Number of the people in the 
household 
4.72 1.68 4.64 1.62 5.01 1.85 
  Television 1 if household has television; 0 
otherwise 
0.96 0.20 0.97 0.18 0.93 0.25 
  Poultry 1 if household has poultry;   0 
otherwise 
0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 
  Non-Food Expenditure Natural log of non-food 
expenditure 
15.37 1.14 15.48 1.14 14.50 1.04 
  Rural 1 if household lives in rural; 0 
otherwise 
0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.49 
Community Characteristics               
  Factory 1 if community has factory in 
sub-districts; 0 otherwise 
0.66 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.69 0.46 
  Elementary Number of elementary school 6.92 5.97 7.06 6.05 6.40 5.65 
  Poverty Level of poverty programme 0.64 0.13 0.64 0.13 0.65 0.13 
 N  4,512 3,543 969 
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations. All estimates are based on households with children aged 
six to fourteen. Mean number of hours for the sample includes those that report zero hours on each activity.  
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4.3.2.1 Child Characteristics 
Among the individual characteristics that affect work decisions are child’s age and sex (Amin 
et al., 2004; Del Carpio et al., 2016; Gee, 2010; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Suryahadi et al., 2005). 
The vector of exogenous, child-specific variables includes age of the child and a dummy 
variable for sex. The control variable is Age and indicates the age of the child in years. The 
average age is 9.87 years. It is expected that families are more likely to send older children to 
work; thus, the coefficient on Age is expected to be positive.  
Gender of the child is a relevant individual characteristic of a working child (Amin et al., 2004; 
Del Carpio et al., 2016; Gee, 2010; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Suryahadi et al., 2005). The variable 
gender takes on a value of one if the child is a boy and zero if the child is a girl. Table 10 shows 
that 51.46 per cent of the children in this thesis are boys, slightly higher for male than female. 
Findings from other studies show boys are more likely to work than girls; thus, a positive sign 
on boys is expected. 
4.3.2.2 Household Head Characteristics 
The child’s work phenomenon is also related to the household head’s characteristics. This thesis 
includes the following variables that control for the family’s demographic composition: 
whether the head of the household is male and household head’s age. It also included variables 
that measure the educational attainment of the head of the household. The variable head of 
household takes on the value one if the head of the household is a man and zero otherwise. We 
expect that male-headed households are less likely to have children working because of social 
status and greater income stability than in female-headed households (Amin et al., 2004). Thus, 
the expected sign on male-headed household is negative. Household heads’ ages would also 
have an impact on children’s working activities. The household head’s age has a decreasing 
effect on their children’s work supply (Attanasio et al., 2010; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Suryahadi 
et al., 2005).  
The variable Headeduc is the number of years of schooling completed by the head of 
households. The average years of schooling for head of households is 9.39 years. Studies in 
other countries have shown that the households headed by persons with higher levels of 
education are less likely to send their children to work than households headed by persons with 
lower levels of education (Del Carpio et al., 2016; Edmonds & Schady, 2012). Thus, the 
expected sign on the education level of the head of household is negative. 
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4.3.2.3 Household Characteristics 
At the household-level data, we include variables that reflect the household economic 
conditions, living conditions and the demographic structure of children within the household. 
Information on living conditions of households comprises standard indicators such as type of 
floor and wall and are used as control variables. Those variables capture the effect of differences 
in wealth, which might also affect the amount of time required to engage in both household 
chores and economic activities (Attanasio et al., 2010; Zapata et al., 2011). On average, living 
conditions are better for recipients of non-beneficiary programme than the beneficiary 
programme. 
Another variable reflecting the demographic structure of children within the household is the 
household size. The variable household size measures the household size as the number of 
people in the household; the mean household size is 4.7 individuals. A positive sign is expected 
on the coefficient of household size since the larger the family, the more children can engage 
in household chores and economic activities (Del Carpio et al., 2016; Edmonds & Schady, 
2012). 
The variable household asset ownership used in this thesis includes livestock or poultry and 
housing appliances such as television. The variable poultry captures household structural 
conditions, such as poor or non-poor, farm or non-farm. The variable poultry is measured in 
terms of a binary response, whether or not households own poultry. A positive sign on the 
coefficient of asset endowments, such as poultry, on child performing household chores and 
economic activities is expected (Del Carpio et al., 2016).  
The empirical literature uses household consumption expenditure rather than income because 
data on expenditure are likely to be more accurate and the beneficiaries group has highly 
unstable income flows, thus current income is not seen as a good proxy for permanent income. 
Furthermore, household income is influenced by the labour force behaviour of the head of 
household. This variable expenditure is measured in terms of natural log of non-food 
expenditure. A positive sign on the coefficient of non-food expenditure on child engaging in 
household chores and economic activities is expected.  
A variable to capture regional effect is included. This thesis considers two types of region 
characteristics: urban and rural areas. This variable takes on a value of one for a child who lives 
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in a rural area and zero if the child lives in an urban area. We expect a negative sign on rural 
because child work outside the home is more prevalent in the informal sector in urban areas. 
4.3.2.4 Community-Level Characteristics 
Child work does not only depend on family and child characteristics but also depends on 
community-level characteristics. Hence, we include three sub-district-level control variables. 
The first represents regional variation in the availability of local labour market conditions that 
might affect child work activities inside and outside the home, the second captures regional 
variation in the availability of schooling, and the third captures regional variation in the poverty 
alleviation programme.  
The variable factory is a dichotomous covariate indicated with the value of one if the districts 
have a factory and zero otherwise. The presence of a school in the sub-districts is used to 
accommodate education supply-side factors. This variable captures the socio-economic 
conditions in the sub-districts, especially in rural areas, where schools are fewer and far 
between, or combined with a lack of roads and transportation. The community module provides 
information on participation in some other in-kind subsidy programme in sub-districts. The 
other relevant programmes operating under the Indonesian social safety net are the 
unconditional cash transfer, conditional cash transfer, rice subsidy and health insurance. This 
variable is used to identify and quantify the level of poverty in the sub-district. The highest 
level of poverty programme is in the sub-districts, thus the poorest of sub-districts. Suitable 
control variables such as household and community-level characteristics should be observable 
to deal with this source of endogeneity.  
4.4 Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model behind the children work decision and the 
“unitary model” of the household where the head of the household is the decision-maker. The 
main purpose is to motivate the empirical exercise by exploring the working child decision-
making process, relating it to child characteristics, household characteristics, community 
characteristics and external interventions such as the presence of a cash transfer programme 
evaluated in this thesis. Within this theoretical framework, we then investigate how income 




The model follows De Silva and Sumarto (2015); Ravallion and Wodon (2000); Rosati (2003) 
where the utility function of the representative household in the model is given by the following: 
  =   (  ,   ,   ∶  )           (1) 
where   is a concave utility function based on the household consumption ( ), the child’s 
schooling ( ), the child’s leisure ( ), and the vector of exogenous individual, family and 
demographic characteristics ( ), which parameterise the utility function. 
The time constraint that maximises utility can be expressed as follows: 
  =   +   +  ,                                                                          (2) 
The household head makes decisions about the allocation of the child’s total time, since it must 
be divided between leisure( ), school attendance( ) , and child’s labour supply( ): where ( ) 
is the time spent on paid or unpaid labour both economic and domestic activities. Equation (1) 
is subject to the restrictions of the child’s time in Equation (2). 
By equating adult exogenous household income   and output from household production with 
cost of production and household consumption, the household budget constraint can be stated 
as follows:   
     +      ≤   +                                                                  (3) 
where    ,     and   are price of consumption, schooling and child labour. The household utility 
maximisation problem can be formally stated as follows: 
    , ,    ( ,  ,   ∶  )                                                               (4) 
The government fiscal policies such as a cash transfer programme (G) can be introduced by 
simply rewriting a new budget constraint that maximises   as follows:  
     +      ≤   +    +                                                         (5) 
The solution to the maximisation problem is a function of prices of consumption, schooling, 
household income, wage rate for the child and a cash transfer given to households of enrolled 
children. In the context of a cash transfer, the cost of schooling can be reduced according to the 
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programme. Equation (5) assumes household income  , adult labour supply and leisure to be 
exogenous, thus when parents become unemployed, it is not because of their choice but due to 
external market condition (De Silva & Sumarto, 2015). 
A cash transfer programme (G) functions as income. Increases in income, including cash 
transfers, could reduce the addition of schooling cost, such as books, uniforms and 
transportation, hence this could increase the relative return to time in school (Edmonds & 
Schady, 2012). The programme can affect the behaviour of beneficiary households because 
vulnerable households are more likely to be affected by income constraints (de Hoop & Rosati, 
2013). Cash transfers can increase child’s schooling involvement and reduce the time spent by 
children working in both economic and domestic activities. Furthermore, cash transfers may 
reduce the probability and number of hours of child labour by providing the regular income that 
families need to survive, which in turn releases children from their economic responsibilities. 
4.5 Econometric Methods: The Bivariate Probit Model with Endogenous Dummy 
This thesis conducts empirical exercises that estimate the effect of participation in the cash 
transfer programme on working activities of children within households. The exercise is post-
treatment evaluation of working child comparing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries groups. 
This thesis carries out the same exercise for participation in different types of activities, as well 
as for the amounts of time spent in work as a robustness check. Both exercises are disaggregated 
into economic activities, household chores and any activity and use the same control variables. 
These consist of a set of individual, household and community characteristics that may have an 
independent effect on child’s work as described by the literature. 
This thesis evaluated the effect of cash transfer programme on child work by analysing the 
probability of participation in a particular type of activity of children within a bivariate Probit 
framework. The model estimated is a limited-dependent-variable model, where the dependent 
variable is binary; either the child is engaged in any of the different working activities or the 
child is not engaged in any activity. Meanwhile, the main independent variable is also binary; 
one if the children received a cash transfer and zero otherwise. In addition, the control variables 
are a set of children, household head, household and community-level characteristics. Thus, 
this thesis considers how to estimate the effect of endogenous binary variables in a binary 
response model.  
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The bivariate Probit model is frequently used for estimating the effect of an endogenous binary 
regressor (Angrist, 2001; Gitto, Santoro, & Sobbrio, 2006; Latif, 2009; Macdonald & Shields, 
2004). To account for endogeneity of the cash transfer programme in the child performing 
household chores, economic activities and any activity, the paper uses a recursive bivariate 
Probit model. The bivariate Probit model provides a convenient setting for estimating the effect 
of an endogenous binary regressor       on a binary outcome variable     in different activities, 
denoted  , which are economic, household chores and any activity. The standard model assumes 
a constant treatment effect, the presence of exclusion restriction and the absence of simultaneity 
(Greene, 2012). Formally, the structural model consists of two Probit equations: 
    
∗ =     +      +       +                                                                                                 (1) 
    
∗ =    +      +      +                                                                                                  (2) 
    = 1 if    
∗ > 0 ,      = 1 if     
∗ > 0 
Where: 
     = 1  if a child   is participating in activity   and a value of zero otherwise.  
     = 1 if a child   in activity   received a cash transfer programme and a value of zero 
otherwise. 
     
∗  and     
∗  are unobserved latent variables that determine whether a child is engaged in 
different activities and being a beneficiary of a cash transfer for poor students respectively. 
   ,    ,   and   are the unknown parameters of interest that we wish to estimate and     ,    are 
the error terms. 
    is a vector of exogenous observable characteristics for children  , which are assumed to be 
predetermined to participate in different activities and the cash transfer programme. 
    is a vector of identifying restrictions that are assumed to influence the probability of 
beneficiary a cash transfer programme, but are orthogonal to    , and  [  ] =  [  ] = 0,         
var [  ] = var [  ] = 1 with cov [    ] =   .  
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Finally,   is the correlation between     and    , which is assumed to follow a bivariate normal 
distribution (Wooldridge, 2010). The likelihood ratio test is used to determine whether   is 
significantly different from zero. If    ,    are not independent due to endogeneity of cash 
transfer for poor students, then maximum likelihood estimation of equation (1) using a 
univariate Probit model will not provide consistent estimates of the impact of programme on 
child work. However, when    and     are not independent, estimating child’s work and cash 
transfer programme jointly in a recursive bivariate Probit framework will yield consistent 
estimates. In addition, we run bivariate Probit regressions and clustering standard errors at the 
community level because some children in our sample are in the same households and some 
households will also have the same community-level characteristics. Because of this, standard 
errors of the coefficients have been corrected for clustering at the community level. 
4.6 Robustness Check 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we provide evidence based on two different 
identification strategies. First, we provide evidence on two dimensions of heterogeneity of 
impact based on gender and residence using data on children participation in different types of 
activity. Second, we provide evidence of the effect of the cash transfer programme using data 
on the number of hours worked. The impact of a cash transfer programme on child’s work may 
differ between girls and boys because gender might play an important role in the decision to 
participate in various tasks. Thus, we estimate the model for the total sample of children and 
then separately by gender. The second aspect of heterogeneity that we consider is location of 
residence. Children may be engaged in different kinds of work depending on whether they live 
in a rural or an urban area. For example, most of those working in rural areas may be engaged 
in agriculture, while those who work in urban areas may be working in manufacturing fields. 
Therefore, we estimate the model for the total sample of children and then separately by rural 
and urban areas. 
For the second robustness check, this thesis uses detailed number of hours worked with the 
programme to assess how the programme could affect the amount of time spent by children in 
economic, household chores and any activity. The number of hours worked is a count variable, 
non-negative integer, and ranges from zero to 56 hours. In this thesis, we propose an estimation 
method that is appropriate for dealing with endogenous participation effects when the 
dependent variable is a count. In conclusion, the second robustness check is using count data 
regression model with an endogenous participation effect. The next section of this thesis 
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extends the analysis of cash transfer in working activities to consider the children as the unit of 
analysis, in order to be controlled statistically, for additional characteristics of the child, head 










5 Chapter 5: Results and Discussions 
This chapter presents the results and discusses the findings. This chapter is split into five 
sections: the first section presents the estimated effect of the cash transfer programme on 
children’s participation in different working activities within households. The second section 
presents robustness tests based on the children’s gender and residence. The third section 
presents another robustness check for the effect of the cash transfer programme on working 
hours. The fourth section discusses the limitations of this thesis. Finally, the last section 
summarises the important results.    
5.1 Empirical Results: Bivariate Probit Model with Endogenous Dummy 
This thesis explores the effects of cash transfer programmes on working activities of children 
within households. Using data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (2014/2015), the model 
utilises a recursive bivariate Probit approach to take into account the potential endogeneity of 
cash transfer programmes in children engaging in different working activities. The dependent 
variables are the probability of a child engaged in household chores, economic activities, and 
any activity. In all exercises, this model uses the same control variables. These consist of a set 
of individual, head of household, household and community characteristics that may have an 
independent effect on the working activities of children within households.  
The main results of interest from the bivariate Probit models are presented in Table 15, and the 
full estimates are provided in Tables A1 – A3 in the Appendix. The marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables are reported since these effects cannot be inferred directly from the 
regression coefficients. In addition, the average marginal effects in Table 16 are calculated as 
the change of the effect of the treatment on the treated, or the expected effect of the treatment 
on individuals with observed characteristic   who participated in the programme. 
5.1.1 Coefficient Estimates 
Table 15 presents coefficients of the bivariate Probit estimations, indicating the directions of 
the effect of the explanatory variables and controlling for other factors such as household and 
community characteristics that might influence these outcomes. Before turning to the variable 




Table 15. Estimation Results of Bivariate Probit Model 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable(s) 
Household Chores (1) Economic Activities (2) Any Activity (3) 
Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std.error 
Cash Transfer -1.2922 *** 0.1243 -0.9946 *** 0.1910 -1.2927 *** 0.1868 
Children Age 0.0780 *** 0.0096 0.1026 *** 0.0139 0.0856 *** 0.0153 
Children Sex -0.3576 *** 0.0564 0.0306   0.0542 -0.3114 *** 0.0711 
Head HH Sex -0.0647   0.0618 0.1128   0.0936 -0.0237   0.0709 
Head HH Age -0.0019   0.0024 -0.0087 *** 0.0032 -0.0030   0.0024 
Head HH Education -0.0139 * 0.0085 -0.0440 *** 0.0109 -0.1901 * 0.0095 
HH Floor -0.2727 *** 0.0592 -0.1842 ** 0.0763 -0.2842 *** 0.0619 
HH Wall 0.1197   0.0812 -0.9303   0.0872 0.1131   0.0794 
HH Size 0.0256   0.0199 0.0660 *** 0.0221 0.0284   0.0240 
HH Television 0.0234   0.0992 -0.1841   0.1535 -0.0045   0.1096 
HH Poultry 0.0719   0.0597 0.0648   0.0786 0.0695   0.0610 
HH Non-Food Exp -0.0618 ** 0.0270 -0.0660 * 0.0389 -0.0599 * 0.0328 
Rural 0.0190   0.0752 -0.1239 * 0.0769 0.0046   0.0745 
Comm Factory 0.0237   0.0661 -0.1083   0.0709 0.0126   0.0674 
Comm Primary School -0.0073   0.0047 -0.0195 *** 0.0063 -0.0083 * 0.0046 
Comm Poverty Prog 0.2230   0.2346 0.6903 ** 0.2839 0.2274   0.2488 
Constant 0.1640  0.4971 -0.7300  0.7284 0.1890  0.6664 
Number of observation        4,512            4,512            4,512      
Rho  0.9004 *** 0.0948 0.7081 *** 0.1055 0.9021 ** 0.1484 
Wald test of rho=0, chi2 8.6680     17.4105     3.4641     
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces on Java island). 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities’ level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
Effect on Household Chores 
Table 15 column 1 provides the results where the dependent variable is children engaged in 
household chores. The value of rho7 ρ is 0.90, with a standard error of 0.0948 and p-value of 
0.003, hence significantly different from zero. Thus, children participating in household chore 
activities and being a beneficiary of a cash transfer programme are jointly determined or 
strongly correlated. On the basis of the Wald test8, the chi-squared value generated by the Wald 
test as well as the p-value associated with a chi-squared is 8.6680. The p-value is less than the 
generally used criterion of 0.05, so we are able to reject the null hypothesis    :   = 0, 
indicating that the coefficients are not simultaneously equal to zero. This implies that the error 
                                                 
7 Rho is a correlation coefficient which is the correlation coefficient between the residuals of each of the two Probit equations. 
8 The Wald statistics is the value of the regression coefficient divided by its associated standard error. The Wald test is commonly used to 
perform multiple degree of freedom tests on sets of dummy variables used to model categorical predictor variables in regression. 
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terms of the equations jointly estimated do not vary together. In other words, the bivariate Probit 
model fits the data better than the separate model. 
In the equation where the dependent variable is children engaged in household chores, it is 
possible to observe a negative9 and significant correlation with a cash transfer programme. A 
negative correlation and statistical significance confirms that receiving cash transfer reduces 
the probability of engaging in household chores. In addition, the estimation results also confirm 
that both children’s characteristics and parental education affect the probability of children 
being engaged in household chores. The coefficient on age of child is positive and statistically 
significant, confirming that the older a child, the higher the probability of involvement in 
household chores. Furthermore, the male child coefficient, which is negative and significant, 
also confirms that male children have a lower probability of engaging in household chores than 
female children. In addition, the education of the household head has a negative effect on the 
incidence of a child involved in household chores, confirming that higher education levels of 
household heads are associated with a lower probability of children engaging in household 
chores. Meanwhile, Table 15 also shows that the reduction in the probability of children 
engaging in household chores does not depend on the gender and age of the head of the 
households. 
The estimation results also indicate that household characteristics also affect the probability of 
whether or not children engage in household chores. It can be seen from Table 15 that the HH 
floor coefficient has a significant negative effect, confirming that the children who live in 
households that have floors of ceramic, marble, granite, and terrazzo have a lower probability 
of participating in household chores, as these also indicate the affluence of households. 
Meanwhile, the per capita non-food expenditure coefficient, which is negative and significant, 
indicates that higher per capita non-food expenditure leads to lower probability of involvement 
in household chores. One possible explanation for this is a correlation between the households’ 
wealth and participation of children in household chores. When the income from the family is 
high enough, they can afford to pay someone else such as maid or skilled labour to do household 
chores. The community-level characteristics appear not to be statistically related to child 
engagement in household chores. 
                                                 
9 Negative effect is the desired outcome as it implies a decreasing participation in household chores, economic activities, and any activity. 
Therefore, children can concentrate in school. 
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Effect on Economic Activities  
Table 15 column 2 provides the result where the dependent variable is children engaged in 
economic activities. The value of rho ρ is 0.71, with a standard error of 0.1055 and p-value 
0.000, hence significantly different from zero. Thus, children who participate in economic 
activities and being a beneficiary of a cash transfer programme are strongly correlated. On the 
basis of the Wald test, the chi-squared value generated by the Wald test as well as the p-value 
associated with a chi-squared is 17.4105. The p-value is less than the generally used criterion 
of 0.05, so for this model we can reject the null hypothesis    :   = 0 , indicating that the 
coefficients are not simultaneously equal to zero. This implies that the error terms of the 
equations jointly estimated do not vary together. In other words, the bivariate Probit model fits 
the data better than does the separate model. The positive sign of the correlation coefficient of 
rho implies that the unobserved factors that increase the probability of being a beneficiary of a 
cash transfer programme also increase children’s involvement in economic activities.  
Table 15 reveals that if the definition of child work considers only economic activities, there is 
a negative and significant correlation with a cash transfer programme. This confirms that 
children who benefitted from the programme have a lower probability of being engaged in 
economic activities. Furthermore, children’s age has a positive and significant impact, implying 
that older children have a higher probability of working in economic activities than younger 
children. The gender of the child has different effects depending on the type of activities of 
children; girls are significantly more involved in household chores, while boys do more on 
economic activities. However, these result are not statistically significant. 
The estimation results also indicate that household-head characteristics are associated with 
children’s participation in economic activities. While the gender of the household head has no 
effect on the probability a child works, age does. The age of household head has a significant 
negative effect, indicating that the older the head of household the lower the probability of 
children participating in economic activities. The educational level of the household head 
measured in years carries a negative coefficient for economic activities, confirming that the 
higher the level of education of the household head, the lower the probability of children 
working. It means that household heads with more education tend to prevent young children 
from working, especially in economic activities. The effects of household head are consistent 
with previous results in the literature (Amin et al., 2004; Attanasio et al., 2010). Thus, it can be 
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concluded that the level of education of household heads is vital to decreasing the probability 
of children working. 
The results also confirm that household characteristics affect the probability of a child being 
involved in economic activities. The indicator of wealth, such as the HH floor, has a negative 
and significant impact; this means that the wealth of a household points to a lower probability 
of children participating in income-generating activities. Meanwhile, the per capita non-food 
expenditure coefficient, which is negative and less significant, indicates that higher per capita 
non-food expenditure leads to lower probability of a household involving their children in 
income-generating activities. The household size carries a positive and significant coefficient 
for economic activities from wage, farm and/or non-farm business; the more people in the 
household, the higher the need for involvement or participation in economic activities because 
of the higher needs from larger households. The rural variable has a significant negative effect; 
this means that children living in rural areas are less likely to be in work than those in urban 
areas.  
The community-level characteristics appear to be statistically related with children in economic 
activities. The higher the number of primary schools in the sub-district significantly decreases 
the probability of children being involved in economic activities. In addition, the higher the 
number of poverty programmes in the sub-districts increases the probability of children 
engaging in economic activities. The number of poverty alleviation programmes in the sub-
district collected data about the recent public social safety net programme. These included two 
rice subsidy programmes: rice for the poor and market operations; health insurance subsidies; 
unconditional cash transfer, and conditional cash transfer. The more the poverty alleviation 
programmes that were implemented in the sub-district, the higher the probability of children 
engaging in income-generating activities. This is because the Government of Indonesia delivers 
a range of social assistance programmes prioritised for poor and vulnerable households. In other 
words, the sub-districts that have more poverty alleviation programmes show that the 
households in these sub-districts are poorer. 
Effect on Any Activity 
Table 15 column 3 provides the results where the dependent variable is children engaged in any 
activity. This category combines children who are engaged in household chores, economic 
activity and both activities. The value of rho ρ, or the correlation coefficient of the disturbances, 
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is positive and significant, hence significantly different from zero. Thus, children participating 
in any activity and being a beneficiary of a cash transfer programme are strongly correlated. On 
the basis of the Wald test, the chi-squared value generated by the Wald test as well as the p-
value associated with a chi-squared is 3.4641. The p-value is less than the generally used 
criterion of 0.05, so for this model we are able to reject the null hypothesis    :   = 0 , 
indicating that the coefficients are not simultaneously equal to zero. This implies that the error 
terms of the equations jointly estimated do not vary together; in other words, the bivariate Probit 
model fits the data better than a separate model.  
The estimation results confirm that the cash transfer programme has a significant negative effect 
on children engaging in any activity. Furthermore, the estimation results also confirm that 
children’s characteristics and parental education affect the probability of children engaging in 
any activity. The coefficient of the age of child variable is significant and positive, confirming 
that the older a child is, the higher the probability of involvement in any activity. Furthermore, 
the male child coefficient, which is negative and significant, also confirms that male children 
have a lower probability of being engaged in any activity than female children. It is possible 
that these results can be explained by the variation of the definition of any activity that include 
household chores, when for this activity the majority involved are girls. Furthermore, gender 
and age differences in child work are expected to be observed because boys and girls have 
different returns from education (Ravallion & Wodon, 2000; Rosati, 2003). 
In terms of the characteristics of the household head, the years of schooling is significant and 
shows a negative sign; this is consistent with the underlying hypothesis that more years of 
parent’s education reduces the probability of children being involved in any activity. In terms 
of household characteristics, only the variables HH floor and HH non-food expenditure show a 
negative and significant probability of children being involved in any activity. In terms of 
community-level characteristics, the number of primary schools has a negative and lower 
statistically significant effect, confirming that the more primary schools in the districts there 
are, the lower the probability of children being engaged in any activity. 
Results of the bivariate Probit regression analysis for the full sample of children are presented 
in Table 15, which reports the coefficient of each variable, its standard error and statistical 
significance. As Table 15 indicates, the value of rho is statistically significant and positive for 
three estimated equations. Overall, these results indicate that the positive sign of the correlation 
coefficient of rho in three estimates implies that the unobserved factors that increase the 
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probability of being a beneficiary of a cash transfer also increase children involvement in 
household chores, economic activities and any activity. The regression results provide some 
evidence that the cash transfer programme has a negative effect on the probability of different 
activities of children within households. The incentive will lead children to allocate more time 
to studying. If students stay in school and progress, they could accumulate more human capital 
and enjoy higher future incomes (Baez & Camacho, 2011). Furthermore, a full set of control 
variables included in the regression shows that child male gender, child’s age, age and education 
of household heads, household’s floor, household size, per capita non-food expenditure, 
household living in rural area, and community characteristics, such as number of primary 
schools and level of poverty programmes in the districts, have significant impact on working 
activities of children. 
5.1.2 Estimates of Marginal Effects 
Table 16 presents average marginal effects of all explanatory variables on the probability that 
beneficiary children are engaged in different activities. The results drawn from Table 16 is that 
the cash transfer programme implemented in six provinces on Java Island had the overall impact 
of reducing the probability of work activities of children within households. There is a 
statistically significant decrease or significant impact on the probability of engaging in 
household chores. For a child receiving a cash transfer, the probability of doing chores is lower 
by about 34 percentage points. In addition, it is evident from the results that the cash transfer 
programme given to children was enough to decrease the probability of a child working in 
economic activities by 38 percentage points. The effect of the programme on participation in 
economic activities is slightly larger than in household chores. The results also show a 
significant effect of the programme on participation in any form of working activities of 
children within households. Children in the programme are 32 percentage points less likely to 
perform any activity within households. The present findings seem to be consistent with other 
research in Mexico (Skoufias & Parker, 2001), Nicaragua (Maluccio & Flores, 2005), Ecuador 
(Edmonds & Schady, 2012) and Honduras (Galiani & McEwan, 2013). On the other hand, these 
results differ from Colombia CCTs in the 2010 estimate of impact of cash transfer that 
participation in income-generating work remained largely unaffected (Attanasio et al., 2010).  
For household chores, other coefficients, such as the children’s age and gender, education of 
the head of households, household size, and household non-food expenditure, jointly determine 
the probability of participants of cash transfer programme and engagement in household chores. 
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The marginal effect of children’s age on the probability of engaging in household chores is 
0.0204; this means that a one-year increase in age will add about 2 percentage points to the 
probability that a child will be involved in household chores. The marginal effect of the dummy 
variable for a male child is -0.0914, meaning that, on average, a boy’s probability of being 
engaged in household chores is 9 percentage points lower than girls. The marginal effect of 
parental education is -0.0063; this means that having more years of education for household 
heads lowers the probability of children being involved in household chores; each additional 
year of education of household heads decreases the probability by about 0.6 percentage points.  
Table 16 also shows that the reduction in the probability of a child’s work does not depend on 
the gender and age of the head of the household. Household size is negative and statistically 
less significant on probability of involvement in household chores. The probability that a child 
will engage in household chores decreases by 1 percentage point for a one-person increase in 
family size. Children with more siblings might be less engaged in household chores. In other 
words, more siblings might also mean more helping hands, which allows for a division of tasks 
at home (Webbink et al., 2013). The marginal effect of household non-food expenditure is -
0.0178, which means that each additional 1 per cent increase in non-food expenditure reduces 
































Cash Transfer -0.3388 *** 0.0980 -0.3779 *** 0.1453 -0.3219 ** 0.1496 
Children Age 0.0204 ** 0.0099 0.0390 *** 0.0057 0.0214   0.0166 
Children Sex -0.0914 * 0.0503 0.0117   0.0208 -0.0760   0.0645 
Head HH Sex 0.0225   0.0163 0.0793 *** 0.0312 0.0327   0.0261 
Head HH Age 0.0009   0.0006 -0.0018 * 0.0011 0.0006   0.0005 
Head HH Educ -0.0063 * 0.0035 -0.0056   0.0039 0.0047   0.0039 
HH Floor -0.0067   0.0121 -0.0018   0.0254 -0.0094   0.0140 
HH Wall 0.0281   0.0236 -0.0399   0.0363 0.0244   0.0279 
HH Size -0.0141 * 0.0077 0.0028   0.0065 -0.0126   0.0101 
HH Television 0.0067   0.0218 -0.0716   0.0581 0.0006   0.0206 
HH Poultry 0.0064   0.0117 0.0089   0.0253 0.0057   0.0118 
HH Non-Food Exp -0.0178 ** 0.0087 0.0121   0.0119 0.0172   0.0130 
Rural -0.0014   0.0146 -0.0506 ** 0.0241 -0.0057   0.0143 
Comm Factory -0.0124   0.0152 -0.0636 *** 0.0243 -0.0151   0.0189 
Comm Primary School -0.0012   0.0011 -0.0064 *** 0.0022 -0.0015   0.0014 
Comm Poverty Prog -0.0643   0.0544 0.1240   0.0970 -0.0584   0.0694 
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces on Java island). 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities’ level. 
***p < 0.01 , **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
For economic activities, the result of particular interest is the positive sign on the coefficient 
for children’s age. The older the child, the greater the probability the child works; each 
additional year adds 4 percentage points to the probability of working in economic activities. 
In addition, there are also different impacts based on whether or not the child is living with a 
male head of household and/or an older head of household. Having a male head of household 
decreases the probability of a child working in income activities by 8 percentage points. The 
older the male head of household is, the greater the decrease in the probability of the child 
working. The marginal effect of the rural variable is -0.0506; this means that living in a rural 
area decreases the probability of a child working in economic activities by 5 percentage points. 
In terms of community characteristics, the presence of an additional factory and primary school 
decreases the probability of a working child. The number of primary schools in the sub-district 
significantly decreases the probability of child working in economic activities by 0.6 percentage 
point for a one-primary school increase in the sub-districts.  A possible explanation for these 
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results may be the lack of adequate primary schools, especially in rural areas. These results 
indicate that increased infrastructure of school buildings will increase household demand for 
schooling, raise the enrolment rate and thereby decrease the probability of children working. 
Furthermore, the availability of primary schools also decreases the distance of the children to 
get to the school to receive education.  
This finding has important implications for developing countries that increase the number of 
schools, particularly in rural areas, and the introduction of social programmes, such as income 
transfer to poor students, with the condition that the child should enrol and attend school. This 
can also explain changes in children’s participation in economic activities. In addition, the 
presence of a factory in the sub-district also significantly decreases the probability of child 
working by 6 percentage points for a one-factory increase in the sub-districts. This result may 
be explained by the fact that a new factory in a sub-district creates a high demand for skilled 
labour, thus reducing child work. Also, because members of households have better 
employment prospects, so income is supplemented. For the outcome of any activity, there are 
no other explanatory variables that have a significant impact on determining whether 
participation in the cash transfer programme affects working activities of children.  
In summary, this thesis aims to analyse the role that a cash transfer programme plays in 
participation in different work activities of children within households of Indonesian families 
in six provinces on Java Island. A bivariate Probit model is used to estimate work participation 
of individuals aged six to 14. The bivariate Probit estimations indicate that the programme has 
a significant impact on child participation in different working activities. The estimations 
represent the average marginal effects of a child receiving a cash transfer on the probability of 
being involved in household chores, economic activities and any activity. Compared with non-
beneficiaries, children who participated in the programme experienced a 32 – 38 percentage 
points decrease in working participation inside and outside the home.  
It can be seen that the probability of children working in household chores and economic 
activities increases with a child’s age, and becoming an adult leads to increased work activity. 
Boys are less frequently involved in domestic work activities compared with girls but are more 
likely to participate in economic activities. Thus, the model has indicated that the age and 
gender of the child are important determinants of activities of children. Other factors, such as 
the age and education of household heads, are important predictors of children’s work. The 
level of household non-food expenditure, number of household size and residence of 
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households also appear to play a role in children’s activities. In terms of community-level 
characteristics, the presence of factories and primary schools appears to decrease the likelihood 
of children participating in economic work. Furthermore, more accessible and better quality 
schools are important because they affect the returns from schooling and reduce child work. 
This thesis provides evidence that increasing household income through a cash transfer 
programme reduces the probability of child work activities among school-age children so they 
can spend more time on school-related activities. Giving more opportunities for a child to go to 
school can also reduce the probability of that child working. Policies such as cash transfer for 
poor students that reduce the cost of education and improve the quality of education can also 
effectively decrease the occurrence of working children. 
These findings are consistent with several previous studies examining the effect of cash 
transfers on child work among children in poor households in other settings (Del Carpio et al., 
2016; Edmonds & Schady, 2012; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Skoufias & 
Parker, 2001). On the other hand, this thesis is contrary to the study by Triningsih and Ichihashi 
(2010) who found that the school subsidy programme in Indonesia is not significantly effective 
in reducing child work. The reason for this is because the government gives subsidies to schools 
to fund their operational fees and thereby releases students from tuition fees. This school 
subsidy programme has provided a small proportion to release a household from economic 
shocks. 
To check the robustness of our results, we provide evidence using two identification strategies: 
first, separate analysis based on child’s gender and residence using working participation of 
children within households; second, regression analysis based on hours worked.  
5.2 Robustness Checks Based on Gender and Residence 
In order to investigate the robustness of the results, this thesis estimated separate bivariate 
Probit models based on gender: boys and girls, and residence: urban and rural. Table 17 shows 
the marginal effects of the cash transfer to poor students on participation in different activities 
based on gender and residence to test for heterogeneous effects of the programme. We report 
the full set of results of Table 17 in the Appendix. The main results show that the programme 
has different impacts on children with different observable characteristics. From the analysis 
based on gender, the estimates show that boys who have benefitted from the cash transfer 
programme experienced a negative statistically significant impact on the probability of 
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engaging in all activities compared to girls. Further, the estimates also show that girls 
experienced a negative impact of the cash transfer programme only on household chores. Cash 
transfer programmes seem to reduce the pressure for girls to work in household chores by 
around 34 percentage points, but the greatest improvements were among boys. The effects of 
the programme are generally largest for boys whose participation in household chores decreased 
by around 40 percentage points. The results are strongly significant in statistical terms at the 
one and five per cent levels respectively. The analysis by gender uncovers clear differences in 
the magnitude of effects of the cash transfer programme for working participation of boys and 
girls. A possible explanation for this might be the common findings in rural areas where girls 
traditionally lag behind boys for school enrolment. An incentive programme like Progresa in 
Mexico, provided larger transfers or stronger incentives to households with girls as a strategy 
to reduce the sex gap in school enrolment and substitute schooling for work (Skoufias & Parker, 
2001).  
Table 17. The Effects of Cash Transfer by Child Attributes 
Sub-Samples  
Dependent Variable(s) 











Boys -0.3990 *** 0.1003 -0.4436 ** 0.1804 -0.3335 ** 0.1347 
Girls -0.3446 *** 0.0157 -0.3430   0.2665 -0.2818   0.5990 
Rural -0.4174 *** 0.0527 -0.3343   0.5685 -0.4003 *** 0.0865 
Urban -0.2652 ** 0.1325 -0.3065 ** 0.1442 -0.2889   0.4745 
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces on Java island). 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities’ level. Each of these comparisons is based on a 
regression with a main effect, for example, a main effect for girls. Additional regressors included but not reported. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
For economic activities, the effects of the programme were generally larger for boys, whose 
participation in economic activities decreased by around 44 percentage points, but girls’ 
participation in economic activities remained largely unaffected. The reason for this may be 
partly because of the lower sample size of girls, therefore resulting in a decrease in precision. 
In addition, programme participation is significantly associated with a decrease of 33 
percentage points in the probability of working in any activities for boys who were aged six to 
14 during the 2014/2015 school year. These findings support other previous research that boys 
experience particular decreases in economic activities, whereas girls experience such decreases 
in household chores (Galiani & McEwan, 2013; Miller & Tsoka, 2012; Skoufias & Parker, 
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2001). These results agree with the findings of other studies in which programme impact of 
cash transfer may differ between girls and boys because of gender difference in types of 
working activity, opportunity costs of schooling and returns to education. 
The fact that the cash transfer has a negative effect on child work for boys and girls shows that 
household decision on time allocation is partly driven by income effects. However, it seems 
that the magnitude of the effect is larger for boys than for girls on household chores. One 
possible reason is that, although the participation of boys in chores and economic activities are 
mainly due to income constraints and can be alleviated by cash transfer, the participation of 
girls in chores may be due to cultural norms10 and income transfer will have a smaller effect in 
the case of the latter. Comparing with the other cash transfer programmes such as Progresa in 
Mexico, this programme has relatively larger declines in the probability of child work for girls 
because the programme adjusted the subsidy amount and differentiated by gender. In other 
words, girls received higher amounts of subsidy. 
To further analyse residence differences, this thesis estimated disaggregated regressions using 
data for rural and urban areas, shown in Table 17. The distribution of impacts on the probability 
of child work varies with the location of programme beneficiaries as well. It can be clearly seen 
that the cash transfer programme has demonstrated a negative effect on the probability of 
children participating in household chores both in the rural and urban areas. The programme 
decreased the probability of children participating in household chores in both urban and rural 
by 27 and 42 percentage points respectively. The greatest reduction in household chores is for 
children in rural areas, by 42 percentage points. This thesis also found a negative significant 
effect on economic activities in urban areas, by 31 percentage points. One possible explanation 
of this is because economic activities has a higher prevalence in urban areas because of labour 
market supply and higher opportunity in urban areas.  Meanwhile, there is no significant effect 
for children participating in economic activities in rural areas. It shows that participation of 
children in economic activities responds less to the programme in rural than in urban areas. 
However, the results show significant effects of the programme on participation in any form of 
child work in rural areas. Children in the programme who are living in a rural area are 40 
percentage points less likely to be involved any activity within households.  
                                                 
10 Previous studies show that in most developing countries girls are more likely than boys to do chores with the perception that it will teach 
them special skills and prepare them for adult life (Webbink et al., 2013; Zapata et al., 2011). 
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The main robustness results show that impact estimates vary among the children beneficiaries. 
Overall, the effects of the cash transfer for poor students programme seem to favour boys over 
girls. From the analysis on subgroups, the estimates show that boys who participate in the 
programme experienced a negative impact on the probability of engaging in household chores, 
economic activities, and any activity. In addition, boys tend to experience a larger reduction in 
participation in economic activity. The probability of working decreases by 33 to 44 percentage 
points for participant or beneficiary children. Meanwhile, girls who participate in the 
programme experience a negative impact on the probability of engaging only in household 
chores. Furthermore, girls experienced relatively larger reduction of involvement in household 
chores. Thus, there are differences in impact of programme in children’s work activities by sex, 
suggesting that gender considerations play an important role in the assignment of children’s 
work responsibilities in Indonesia. It is important to note that the cash transfer for poor students 
does not provide a higher incentive for girls in school as in Progresa in Mexico. 
The estimates also show that children from beneficiary households in urban areas experienced 
a smaller impact of the programme on participation in activities inside and outside the home 
than rural children. This could be attributable to the facts that the number of vulnerable 
households are mostly in rural areas and children in rural areas need more assistance than those 
in urban areas. In addition, poor and vulnerable households in rural sub-district areas are 
typically more vulnerable to economic shocks. Thus, the result shows that the targeting 
mechanism of the programme is efficient because of the largest effect on children living in 
impoverished localities and who come from a lower socio-economic background. To 
summarise, these results show that the impact of cash transfer programme is robust to different 
specifications and persists when children are disaggregated by sex and residence. We will 
discuss further the robustness of our results in the next section.   
5.3 Robustness Checks Based on Work Hours 
A third phase of the analysis explores the robustness of the estimates of programme effects on 
number of work hours. We carry out the same exercise for participation in different types of 
work, as well as for the amounts of time spent in different activities. The dependent variable in 
this thesis is the number of hours children are involved in household chores, economic 
activities, and any activity or total hours after the programme had been implemented. In 
addition, the number of hours worked is non-negative and it is a count variable, thus we also 
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fitted a Poisson regression. In this case, the count variable for the number of hours will include 
zero11 for children who do not work.  
The main independent variable is the treatment variable: one if the child received the cash 
transfer programme and zero otherwise. A model specification we are particularly interested in 
is that of a simultaneous model with a count and a binary variable as endogenous regressors. 
Endogenous treatment effects on number of hours describes the behaviour of children with and 
without cash transfer programmes. In treatment effects, the endogenous binary-variable model 
fit by Poisson regression is a nonlinear potential-outcome model that allows for a specific 
correlation structure between the unobservable factors that affect the treatment and the 
unobservable factors that affect the potential outcomes.  
Table 18 shows the impact of the cash transfer programme on weekly hours worked. This model 
allows for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity in the covariates using the endogenous 
Poisson regression model. The final endogenous Poisson shows statistically significant rho 
parameters, which supports the adequacy of the endogenous Poisson specification. It is evident 
from the results in Table 18 that the cash transfer programme given to children was effective at 
reducing the amount of time spent in household chores, economic activities and any activity, 
thus allowing children to spend more time on school-related activities. The Wald test is highly 
significant, indicating a good model fit and we can reject the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the treatment errors and the outcome errors. The effect of cash transfer on number of 
hours turns out to be statistically significant and negative, as in the bivariate Probit model. The 
results are indeed consistent with previous research which has shown that transfer programmes 
reduced hours worked (Attanasio et al., 2010; Del Carpio et al., 2016; Edmonds & Schady, 
2012; Maluccio & Flores, 2005). Although, this finding is different from Bolsa Familia in 
Brazil, for children who are currently working, as their weekly working hours do not necessarily 
decrease (Pais et al., 2017). 
From the model estimation, it is clear that the number of hours in household chores is affected 
by multiple explanatory variables, such as age and gender of children and type of household 
floor. The other explanatory variables that emerge as statistically significant determinants on 
the number of hours in economic activity are the following: children’s age, which has a positive 
effect on the number of hours worked; children’s gender in any models, which has a significant 
                                                 
11 There are more zeros in the data. The motivation for this robustness check is to handle the endogeneity of the cash transfer, not to handle the 
excess of zeros. 
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positive effect; and some variables in household characteristics and community-level 
characteristics. The results for the other explanatory variables show consistency with previous 
studies. 
Table 18. Parameter Estimates Obtained with Endogenous Poisson-Quasi Maximum 
Likelihood  
Independent Variables 
Dependent Variable(s) (Number of Hours) 
Household Chores (1) Economic Activities (2) Total Hours (3) 
Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std.error 
Cash Transfer -0.8768 *** 0.2385 -1.9424 *** 0.1584 -0.5374 *** 0.0769 
Children Age 0.2925 *** 0.0254 0.4751 *** 0.0235 0.3270 *** 0.0151 
Children Sex -1.1906 *** 0.1651 -2.2637 *** 0.1255 -0.9035 *** 0.0667 
Head HH Sex -0.0296  0.2937 -0.1657  0.1465 0.3744 *** 0.0891 
Head HH Age -0.0037  0.0097 -0.0401 *** 0.0042 -0.0110 *** 0.0032 
Head HH Education -0.0033  0.0182 -0.0731 *** 0.0156 -0.0258 ** 0.0102 
HH Floor -0.6884 ** 0.3097 -0.1818  0.1278 -0.7837 *** 0.0874 
HH Wall 0.2513  0.3207 -0.7599 *** 0.1712 0.0735  0.0996 
HH Size -0.1009  0.0882 -0.1197 *** 0.0206 0.0496 ** 0.0189 
HH Television -0.0040  0.4089 -0.8565 *** 0.1597 1.8666 *** 0.1300 
HH Poultry 0.1948  0.1035 0.5889  0.1755 0.2276 *** 0.0785 
HH Non-Food Exp -0.0372  0.1292 0.0064  0.0834 0.0579 ** 0.0292 
Rural -0.3083  0.2889 -0.0573  0.1171 -0.5539  0.0872 
Comm Factory -0.0430  0.3679 0.0821  0.0971 -0.2578 *** 0.0656 
Comm Primary School -0.0202  0.0196 -0.0242 * 0.0095 -0.1031 *** 0.0063 
Comm Poverty Prog 0.2747  0.7708 2.3596 *** 0.5796 0.7779 *** 0.2631 
Constant -2.6655  1.9923 -5.9731 *** 1.4788 -6.2765 *** 0.4830 
Number of observation 4,512   4,512   4,512   
Rho  0.3309  0.0667 0.3275  0.0403 0.2274  0.03647 
Wald test of rho=0, chi2 21.4 ***  56.79 ***  36.22 ***  
Source: Author’s calculation from IFLS 5 (6 provinces on Java island). 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities’ level. Number of hours for the sample, includes 
that report zero hours on each activity. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
Poisson treatment regression estimates the parameters of a Poisson regression model that 
includes an endogenous binary-treatment variable. The dependent variable must be a Poisson 
distributed count. The parameter estimates from a Poisson regression with endogenous 
treatment effects can be used to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE), the average 
difference of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries potential outcomes and the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET). In this model, the ATE and ATET will only coincide 
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when there is no correlation between the treatment errors and outcome errors and the exogenous 
covariates x have the same distribution in the general children and participant children. 
The average treatment effect is the average difference of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
potential outcomes. The ATE estimation of the cash transfer on the number of hours in 
household chores is 1.12 hours. There will be a 1.12-hours reduction in household chores when 
the average child receives a cash transfer programme. The ATE estimated of the cash transfer 
on the number of hours in economic activities is 0.98. This means that there will be a reduction 
of 0.98 hours in economic activities when an average child receives money from the cash 
transfer programme to poor students. The ATE estimated the cash transfer on the number of 
hours in any activity is 0.99. This means that there is a reduction of 0.99 hours in any activity 
when an average child receives money from the cash transfer programme to poor students. 
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) is the average difference of the 
beneficiaries’ and non-beneficiaries’ potential outcomes in the treated population. The 
estimated ATET of cash transfer on the number of hours working in household chores is 2.57 
hours. Thus, the participant children in the programme will have 2.57 less hours of work when 
they receive the cash transfer for poor students. The number is higher than the ATE. The 
estimated ATET of cash transfer on the number of hours work in economic activities 3.02, thus, 
participant children will have 3.02 less hours work on economic activities. The estimated ATET 
of cash transfer on the number of hours work in any activity 1.96, thus, children in the 
programme will have 1.96 less hours work on any activity. In conclusion, children in the 
programme experience larger reductions in time spent in household chores, economic activities, 
and any activity. 
These findings further support the idea that income transfers can reduce the number of hours a 
child will engage in work activities. This income assistance is also expected to reduce the 
pressure for participant children to work so they can spend more time on school-related 
activities. The present findings seem to be consistent with other research found in Nicaragua 
(Gee, 2010). However, these results contrast with the results reported in the Progresa study, in 
which there was no statistically significant effect of a cash transfer programme on a child’s 




The findings in this thesis are subject to three limitations. First, this thesis made use of a non-
experimental research design since the programme was already in progress when the research 
began, thus making it difficult to test for differences between children at the pre-programme 
time. Ideally, programme effects would have been measured by a random assignment of 
students to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries groups before the programme was implemented. 
Second, the study used only post-programme data, and there is no information about baseline 
characteristics of households, and we do not know for how long children were in the 
programme. Third, the results may not be generalised to children from different provinces 
outside of Java because of different supply-side of education in terms of access, distance and 
number of schools. 
5.5 Summary 
The findings of our analysis can be summarised into three points. The first major finding is that 
the cash transfer for poor students led to a reduction in the probability of a child engaging in 
work as a consequence of cash transfer programmes. The results show that taking endogeneity 
into account has important consequences for the estimated effect of the cash transfer 
programme on a working child; failing to take endogeneity into account may result in 
substantially biased results. The second finding is that the cash transfer programme had varying 
effects on different types of activity and different by gender and residence. The third finding is 
cash transfer to poor students reduced time spent by children in the programme in different 
working activities. These results are consistent with a growing literature that documents that 
cash transfers can reduce child work. In addition, the estimated effects of certain control 
variables at the individual level of analysis should clarify for policymakers what household and 
community factors are currently important constraints on working probabilities of children aged 
six to 14 from disadvantaged family backgrounds. The next chapter discusses the conclusion 
and policy recommendations. 
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6 Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess how the cash transfer for poor students programme has 
affected the work involvement of children within households. The programme is designed to 
cover indirect costs associated with education, for instance, transportation costs, uniforms and 
school equipment. Continuation in the programme was conditional on enrolment, attendance 
and passing grade at the end of the school year. This programme seems to be an effective way 
for reducing child work. For this purpose, child work outcome models were constructed where 
the main explanatory variable is the status of a child’s participation in the cash transfer 
programme. 
This thesis improves upon previous research by combining a series of features only partially 
present in those studies: it employs data to assess the effect of child’s work on participation and 
hours of work to identify differences in outcomes according to the nature of children’s work. 
This outcome includes working in economic activities as well as involving in household chores 
as a category of work. In addition, this data provides a more comprehensive picture of child 
work in terms of younger-aged working children. Finally, this thesis examines the effectiveness 
of the programme based on gender: boys and girls, and residence: urban and rural. 
In this thesis, we develop a bivariate Probit model and estimate it using data from six provinces 
on Java Island. We define work as a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a child is 
participating in household chores, economic activities, as well as any activity, and a value of 
zero otherwise. In addition, we add child, head of households, households and community level-
characteristics to our model. In order to check the robustness of our results, we provide evidence 
using two identification strategies. First, we separate analysis based on child’s gender and 
residence using working participation of children within households. Second, regression 
analysis is based on hours worked.  
In this thesis, we use a micro-econometric model and non-experimental data to estimate the 
effects of cash transfer programme on working activities of children within households. The 
results support our contention that receipt of cash transfer programme should be considered a 
potential endogenous explanatory variable because the recipients of the cash transfer 
programme were not assigned randomly; instead, students from poor households were 
specifically targeted. When we correct for endogeneity, we find evidence that the cash transfer 
programme can lead to a reduction in child’s work participation as well as number of hours 
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worked. Thus, being a beneficiary leads to a substantial reduction in the probability of working 
and length of working time. 
The estimations confirmed previous findings that, in practice, cash transfer interventions 
decrease child’s work. This thesis has found that the cash transfer programme for poor students 
significantly reduced the probability of working activities of children within households. The 
programme’s impact is quite large. It was estimated to have reduced the probability of 
engagement in household chores, economic activities, and any activity by 32 – 38 percentage 
points. In addition, the main robustness results show that the impact estimated varied among 
the children beneficiaries. The effects of the cash transfer for poor students programme seemed 
to favour boys over girls. The estimation analysis also showed that children from beneficiary 
households in urban areas experienced a smaller impact of the programme on participation in 
activities inside and outside the home than rural children. There will be 1.12-hour, 0.98-hour 
and 0.99-hour reductions in household chores, economic activities and any activity respectively 
when the average child receives a cash transfer programme. Finally, there will be a 2.57-hour, 
3.02-hour and 1.96-hour reductions in household chores, economic activities and any activity 
respectively for children as beneficiaries. Thus, the findings of this thesis suggest that the 
programme features in cash transfer for poor students can promote schooling and reduce the 
probability of child work. 
The results in this thesis also contributed to an ongoing discussion about the extent of the effects 
of cash transfer programme on child’s work as a result of the income effects or the transfer 
conditions to poor households. Both the Indonesian and Latin American experiences showed 
poverty remains a core factor contributing to child work. The reduction in child work due to a 
cash transfer programme offer has the potential to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, 
pushing many children living in vulnerable families out of child work and potentially pulling 
them into educational activities, such as schooling, that can benefit their overall future 
development of human capital and welfare (Edmonds & Schady, 2012). 
With evidence that the cash transfer programme helps to reduce working activities of children 
within households, there are several factors that could limit the applicability and usefulness of 
our results for cash transfer programme analysis. First, the effect of cash transfer programme 
on activities of children is estimated for a sample of children who live on Java Island. The result 
cannot present the effect of cash transfer programme for the mass majority of families in 
Indonesia because provinces outside of Java have different supply-side characteristics of 
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education such as number of schools and access to education. The quality of schooling may 
vary depending on the province of the country. Further research might explore or investigate 
national data. Second, the effect is only at one time point in 2014, so it cannot account for the 
duration of the cash transfer in children receiving benefits from the programme. Further 
research is needed to account for the varying time and duration effects. 
Cash transfer is a relatively safe policy instrument to improve child welfare. Over the past ten 
years, Indonesia has made major progress in reducing the number of children involved in child 
work. It has done so primarily by expanding education provision to increase the time children 
spend in school and reduce the time children allocate to work. This progress has been supported 
by the implementation of poverty alleviation programmes providing income support to 
vulnerable families. On the other hand, there are still many children at the primary and junior 
school levels who do not receive cash transfers as their financial support. These children are 
not registered at the basic education level. It could be because they are categorised as street 
children, helping their parents to earn money or their parents are not interested in sending their 
children to school because they live in remote areas.  
Given the findings of this thesis, policies are needed to ensure that the programme can 
effectively reach the poorest children who are out of school. Many students who have dropped 
out of school are not eligible to receive the programme, many of whom come from poor 
households who would need financial assistance. Thus, the programme should be expanded to 
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Table A1. Estimation Results Bivariate Probit Model for Household Chores 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.error 
Equation Household Chores      
  Cash Transfer -1.2922 *** 0.1243 
  Children Age 0.0780 *** 0.0096 
  Children Sex -0.3576 *** 0.0564 
  Head HH Sex -0.0647  0.0618 
  Head HH Age -0.0019  0.0024 
  Head HH Educ -0.0139 * 0.0085 
  HH Floor -0.2727 *** 0.0592 
  HH Wall 0.1197  0.0812 
  HH Size 0.0256  0.0199 
  HH Television 0.0234  0.0992 
  HH Poultry 0.0719  0.0597 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.0618 ** 0.0270 
  Rural 0.0190  0.0752 
  Comm Factory 0.0237  0.0661 
  Comm Primary School -0.0073  0.0047 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.2230  0.2346 
  Const 0.1640  0.4971 
Equation Cash Transfer      
  Head HH Sex -0.2042 ** 0.0849 
  Head HH Age -0.0075 *** 0.0027 
  Head HH Educ -0.0519 *** 0.0094 
  HH Floor -0.3423 *** 0.0726 
  HH Wall 0.0241  0.1038 
  HH Size 0.1092 *** 0.0233 
  HH Television -0.0027  0.1226 
  HH Poultry 0.0650  0.0673 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.1783 *** 0.0297 
  Rural 0.0337  0.0784 
  Comm Factory 0.0979  0.0702 
  Comm Primary School -0.0038  0.0050 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.6432 ** 0.3013 
  Const 2.1262 *** 0.4656 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 






Table A2. Estimation Results Bivariate Probit Model for Economic Activities 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.error 
Equation Economic Activities      
  Cash Transfer -0.9946 *** 0.1910 
  Children Age 0.1026 *** 0.0139 
  Children Sex 0.0306  0.0542 
  Head HH Sex 0.1128  0.0937 
  Head HH Age -0.0087 *** 0.0032 
  Head HH Educ -0.0440 *** 0.0109 
  HH Floor -0.1842 ** 0.0763 
  HH Wall -0.0930  0.0872 
  HH Size 0.0661 *** 0.0222 
  HH Television -0.1841  0.1535 
  HH Poultry 0.0648  0.0786 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.0660 * 0.0389 
  Rural -0.1239 * 0.0770 
  Comm Factory -0.1083  0.0709 
  Comm Primary School 0.0195 *** 0.0063 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.6903 ** 0.2839 
  Const -0.7300  0.7284 
Equation Cash Transfer      
  Head HH Sex -0.2019 ** 0.0863 
  Head HH Age -0.0072 *** 0.0028 
  Head HH Educ -0.0543 *** 0.0096 
  HH Floor -0.3377 *** 0.0729 
  HH Wall 0.0179  0.1057 
  HH Size 0.1085 *** 0.0242 
  HH Television -0.0065  0.1285 
  HH Poultry 0.0770  0.0683 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.1812 *** 0.0310 
  Rural 0.0213  0.0810 
  Comm Factory 0.1036  0.0730 
  Comm Primary School -0.0048  0.0055 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.6738 ** 0.3141 
  Const 2.1640 *** 0.4787 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 











Table A3. Estimation Results Bivariate Probit Model for Any Activity 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.error 
Equation Any Activity      
  Cash Transfer -1.2927 *** 0.1868 
  Children Age 0.0859 *** 0.0154 
  Children Sex -0.3114 *** 0.0712 
  Head HH Sex -0.0237  0.0709 
  Head HH Age -0.0030  0.0024 
  Head HH Educ -0.0190 * 0.0095 
  HH Floor -0.2842 *** 0.0619 
  HH Wall 0.1131  0.0794 
  HH Size 0.0284  0.0240 
  HH Television -0.0045  0.1096 
  HH Poultry 0.0695  0.0610 
  HH Non-Food expenditure -0.0599 * 0.0328 
  Rural 0.0046  0.0745 
  Comm Factory 0.0126  0.0675 
  Comm Primary School -0.0083 * 0.0046 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.2274  0.2488 
  Const 0.1890  0.6664 
Equation Cash Transfer      
  Head HH Sex -0.2043 ** 0.0850 
  Head HH Age -0.0075 ** 0.0027 
  Head HH Educ -0.0522 *** 0.0094 
  HH Floor -0.3408 *** 0.0724 
  HH Wall 0.0262  0.1053 
  HH Size 0.1083 *** 0.0232 
  HH Television -0.0095  0.1231 
  HH Poultry 0.0636  0.0673 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.1771 *** 0.0297 
  Rural 0.0375  0.0783 
  Comm Factory 0.1014  0.0713 
  Comm Primary School -0.0034  0.0050 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.6344 ** 0.3077 
  Const 2.1207 *** 0.4674 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 




























Cash Transfer -0.3988 *** 0.1003 -0.4436 ** 0.1804 -0.3335 ** 0.1347 
Children Age 0.0225 ** 0.0101 0.0443 *** 0.0066 0.0206 * 0.0123 
Children Sex                   
Head Sex 0.0280   0.0245 0.1174 ** 0.0493 0.0370   0.0278 
Head Age 0.0011   0.0009 -0.0024   0.0016 0.0004   0.0006 
Head Educ 0.0089 * 0.0047 -0.0077   0.0056 0.0051   0.0040 
HH Floor -0.0157   0.0235 -0.0032   0.0371 -0.0155   0.0198 
HH Wall 0.0168   0.0272 -0.0061   0.0475 0.0144   0.0212 
HH Size -0.1929 ** 0.0099 -0.0061   0.0092 -0.0143   0.0099 
HH Television 0.0510   0.0549 -0.0013   0.0795 0.0358   0.0452 
HH Poultry -0.0075   0.0170 -0.0101   0.0324 -0.0064   0.0135 
HH Non-Food Expenditure 0.0249 ** 0.0103 0.0083   0.0156 0.0193 * 0.0113 
Rural -0.0041   0.0227 -0.0477   0.0394 -0.0093   0.0184 
Comm Factory -0.0078   0.0191 -0.0713 ** 0.0321 -0.0100   0.0168 
Comm Elementary School -0.0021   0.0020 -0.0092 *** 0.0030 -0.0022   0.0021 
Comm Poverty Programme -0.0966   0.0683 0.1833   0.1433 -0.0676   0.0614 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 











































Cash Transfer -0.3446 *** 0.0157 -0.3430   0.2665 -0.2818   0.5991 
Children Age 0.0301   0.0569 0.0343 *** 0.0095 0.0416   0.0367 
Children Sex                   
Head HH Sex 0.0222   0.0351 0.0614   0.0477 0.0382   0.3275 
Head HH Age 0.0011   0.0013 -0.0013   0.0015 0.0010   0.0011 
Head HH Educ 0.0063   0.0078 -0.0030   0.0048 0.0057   0.0042 
HH Floor -0.0078   0.0510 -0.0010   0.0358 -0.0234   0.0693 
HH Wall 0.0602   0.1309 -0.0567   0.0472 0.0752   0.0913 
HH Size -0.0157   0.0192 0.0111   0.0095 -0.0152 ** 0.0077 
HH Television -0.0286   0.0690 -0.1229 * 0.0731 -0.0601   0.0794 
HH Poultry 0.0291   0.0541 0.0296   0.0332 0.0366   0.0393 
HH Non-Food Expenditure 0.0175   0.0162 0.0154   0.0154 0.0194   0.0151 
Rural 0.0008   0.0249 -0.0606 * 0.0350 -0.0001   0.0307 
Comm Factory -0.0245   0.0443 -0.0528   0.0332 -0.0344   0.0306 
Comm Primary School -0.0006   0.0023 -0.0043   0.0029 -0.0011   0.0029 
Comm Poverty Programme -0.0606   0.1149 0.0618   0.1086 -0.0774   0.1044 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 










































Cash Transfer -0.4175 *** 0.0527 -0.3343   0.5685 -0.4003 *** 0.0865 
Children Age 0.0327 ** 0.0144 0.0417 ** 0.0225 0.0354   0.0255 
Children Sex -0.1342 ** 0.0609 0.0308   0.0352 -0.1120   0.0831 
Head HH Sex -0.0465   0.0350 0.1188   0.0729 -0.0275   0.0316 
Head HH Age 0.0015   0.0010 0.0002   0.0017 0.0013   0.0010 
Head HH Educ 0.0090 * 0.0047 -0.0034   0.0068 0.0069   0.0055 
HH Floor -0.0424   0.0310 -0.0011   0.0364 -0.0420   0.0446 
HH Wall 0.0352   0.0292 0.0124   0.0418 0.0298   0.0315 
HH Size -0.0078   0.0069 -0.0588   0.0131 -0.0073   0.0068 
HH Television 0.0251   0.0347 -0.0133   0.0804 0.0187   0.0370 
HH Poultry 0.0174   0.0235 0.0116   0.0462 0.0075   0.0232 
HH Non-Food Expenditure 0.0278 ** 0.0109     0.0194 0.0266 * 0.0155 
Rural                   
Comm Factory -0.2876   0.0344 -0.0867   0.0561 -0.0409   0.0471 
Comm Primary School 0.0031   0.0025 -0.0068   0.0046 0.0019   0.0025 
Comm Poverty Programme -0.1284   0.1303 0.0653   0.1666 -0.0936   0.1380 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 










































Cash Transfer -0.2652 ** 0.1325 -0.3065 ** 0.1442 -0.2889   0.4745 
Children Age 0.0135   0.0091 0.0345 *** 0.0067 0.0169   0.0426 
Children Sex -0.0672   0.0502 0.0002   0.0237 -0.0687   0.1823 
Head HH Sex 0.0359   0.0282 0.0511   0.0363 0.0497   0.1254 
Head HH Age 0.0007   0.0006 -0.0030 ** 0.0013 0.0004   0.0008 
Head HH Educ 0.0048   0.0040 -0.0060   0.0039 0.0045   0.0109 
HH Floor 0.0087   0.0129 -0.0020   0.0319 0.0063   0.0165 
HH Wall 0.0210   0.0252 -0.0260   0.0521 0.0238   0.0813 
HH Size -0.0117   0.0100 0.0006   0.0076 -0.0127   0.0338 
HH Television 0.0168   0.0288 -0.0593   0.0800 0.0102   0.0462 
HH Poultry -0.0001   0.0107 0.0189   0.0283 0.0031   0.0173 
HH Non-Food Expenditure 0.0106   0.0094 0.0115   0.0127 0.0130   0.0325 
Rural                   
Comm Factory -0.0034   0.0121 -0.0404   0.0289 -0.0043   0.0161 
Comm Primary School -0.0015   0.0013 -0.0060 ** 0.0025 -0.0019   0.0048 
Comm Poverty Programme -0.0484   0.0532 0.1500   0.1077 -0.0567   0.1589 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 


























Table A8. Estimation Results Endogenous Poisson-Quasi Maximum Likelihood for 
Household Chores 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.error 
Equation Household Chores      
  Cash Transfer -0.8768 *** 0.2385 
  Children Age 0.2925 *** 0.2925 
  Children Sex -1.1906 *** 0.1651 
  Head Sex -0.0296  0.2937 
  Head Age -0.0037  0.0097 
  Head Educ -0.0033  0.0182 
  HH Floor -0.6884 ** 0.3097 
  HH Wall 0.2513  0.3207 
  HH Size -0.1009  0.0882 
  HH Television -0.0040  0.4089 
  HH Poultry 0.1948  0.1035 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.0372  0.1292 
  Rural -0.3083  0.2889 
  Comm Factory -0.0400  0.3679 
  Comm Elementary school -0.0202  0.0196 
  Comm Poverty Prog 0.2747  0.7708 
  Const -2.6655  1.9923 
Equation Cash Transfer      
  Head Sex -0.2194 ** 0.0908 
  Head Age -0.0075 ** 0.0027 
  Head Educ -0.0550 *** 0.0097 
  HH Floor -0.3558 *** 0.0769 
  HH Wall 0.0155  0.1041 
  HH Size 0.1067 *** 0.0248 
  HH Television -0.0184  0.1323 
  HH Poultry 0.0914  0.0667 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.1816 *** 0.0333 
  Rural -0.0104  0.0840 
  Comm Factory 0.1160  0.0760 
  Comm Elementary school -0.0054  0.0056 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.7112 ** 0.3175 
  Const 2.2460 *** 0.5108 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 






Table A9. Estimation Results Endogenous Poisson-Quasi Maximum Likelihood for 
Economic Activities 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.error 
Equation Economic Activities      
  Cash Transfer -1.9424 *** 0.1584 
  Children Age 0.4751 *** 0.1255 
  Children Sex -2.2637 *** 0.0235 
  Head HH Sex -0.1657  0.1465 
  Head HH Age -0.0401 *** 0.0042 
  Head HH Educ -0.0731 *** 0.0156 
  HH Floor -0.1819  0.1278 
  HH Wall -0.7599 *** 0.1712 
  HH Size -0.1197 *** 0.0206 
  HH Television -0.8566 *** 0.1597 
  HH Poultry 0.5889  0.1755 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure 0.0064  0.0834 
  Rural -0.0574  0.1171 
  Comm Factory 0.0821  0.0971 
  Comm Primary School -0.0242 * 0.0095 
  Comm Poverty Programme 2.3596 *** 0.5769 
  Const -5.9732 *** 1.4788 
Equation Cash Transfer      
  Head HH Sex -0.2220 ** 0.0854 
  Head HH Age -0.0074 ** 0.0028 
  Head HH Educ -0.0536 *** 0.0096 
  HH Floor -0.3390 *** 0.0719 
  HH Wall 0.0156  0.1073 
  HH Size 0.1022 *** 0.0238 
  HH Television -0.0183  0.1283 
  HH Poultry 0.0579  0.0684 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.1807 *** 0.0304 
  Rural 0.0290  0.0811 
  Comm Factory 0.1222 * 0.0723 
  Comm Primary School -0.0046  0.0055 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.6756 ** 0.3131 
  Const 2.2173 *** 0.4685 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 













Table A10. Estimation Result Endogenous Poisson-Quasi Maximum Likelihood for Any 
Activity (Total Hours) 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.error 
Equation Any Activity      
  Cash Transfer -0.5374 *** 0.0769 
  Children Age 0.3270 *** 0.0151 
  Children Sex -0.9035 *** 0.0667 
  Head HH Sex 0.3744 *** 0.0891 
  Head HH Age -0.0110 *** 0.0032 
  Head HH Educ -0.0258 ** 0.0102 
  HH Floor -0.7837 *** 0.0874 
  HH Wall 0.0735  0.0996 
  HH Size 0.0496 ** 0.0189 
  HH Television 1.8666 *** 0.1300 
  HH Poultry 0.2276 *** 0.7847 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure 0.0579 ** 0.0292 
  Rural -0.5539  0.0872 
  Comm Factory -0.2579 *** 0.0656 
  Comm Primary School -0.1031 *** 0.0063 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.7779 *** 0.2631 
  Const -6.2765 *** 0.4830 
Equation Cash Transfer      
  Head HH Sex -0.1977 ** 0.0873 
  Head HH Age -0.0076 ** 0.0027 
  Head HH Educ -0.0557 *** 0.0095 
  HH Floor -0.3582 *** 0.0728 
  HH Wall 0.0119  0.1052 
  HH Size 0.1123 *** 0.0242 
  HH Television 0.0778  0.1325 
  HH Poultry 0.0853  0.0669 
  HH Non-Food Expenditure -0.1768 *** 0.0305 
  Rural -0.5766  0.0844 
  Comm Factory 0.0995  0.0701 
  Comm Primary School -0.0092 * 0.0056 
  Comm Poverty Programme 0.7152 ** 0.3096 
  Const 2.0610 *** 0.4710 
Note: Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the communities' level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
 
 
 
